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ABSTRACT

Mobile device data continues to increase in significance in both civil and criminal
investigations. Location data is often of particular interest. To date, research has established that
the devices are location aware, incorporate a variety of resources to obtain location information,
and cache the information in various ways. However, a review of the existing research suggests
varying degrees of reliability of any such recovered location data. In an effort to clarify the issue,
this project offers case studies of multiple Android mobile devices utilized in controlled
conditions with known settings and applications in documented locations. The study uses data
recovered from test devices to corroborate previously identified accuracy trends noted in
research involving live-tracked devices, and it further offers detailed analysis strategies for the
recovery of location data from devices themselves. A methodology for reviewing device data for
possible artifacts that may allow an examiner to evaluate location data reliability is also
presented. This paper also addresses emerging trends in device security and cloud storage, which
may have significant implications for future mobile device location data recovery and analysis.
Discussion of recovered cloud data introduces a distinct and potentially significant resource for
investigators, and the paper addresses the cloud resources’ advantages and limitations.

iii

This work is dedicated to my beloved Granddaddy. Every one of your “Seven Pillars” has
supported me in this effort. Thank you for a legacy of love, an example of incredible integrity,
and a lifetime of cherished memories. Rest with the peace you have so truly earned.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Special thanks to Theresa Adams and Donna Wallace for their support and assistance
with this project, and with so much more.
Additional thanks to Mike Baute, Korey Diener, Ron Serber, and Jonathan Gajda for the
opportunity to utilize the latest and greatest in data recovery technology.
Finally, I cannot overstate the gratitude and love I have for my family. Thank you all for
the constant influx of joy and encouragement you are. You really are my inspiration, and you are
so, so treasured!

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................. ix
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................... xii
LIST OF ACRONYMS (or) ABBREVIATIONS .....................................................................xiv
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................1
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW...............................................................................3
Proliferation and Utilization of Mobile Devices .......................................................................3
Device Capabilities and Location Awareness ..........................................................................6
Existing Research on Location Data Recovery and Reliability ............................................... 14
Accuracy of Device Location Services .............................................................................. 14
Recovery of Location Data from Devices .......................................................................... 23
Use of Mobile Device Location Data in Criminal Cases ........................................................ 26
Emerging Issues .................................................................................................................... 29
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY ................................................................................... 33
CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS ................................................................................................. 37
Extraction Issues ................................................................................................................... 37
Cloud Data Recovery ............................................................................................................ 39
Recovery of Device Location Data ........................................................................................ 42
vi

App and File Review ......................................................................................................... 42
Identifying Location-Permitted Apps ............................................................................. 44
SQLite Database Analysis – Fitness App Example ........................................................ 49
Chat and Location-Sharing Apps ................................................................................... 52
Leisure and Navigation Apps ......................................................................................... 56
Browser, Weather Apps, and Games .............................................................................. 60
App Trends .................................................................................................................... 64
Metadata and Logs ............................................................................................................ 66
Accuracy Evaluation ............................................................................................................. 72
Geo-Tagged Photos ........................................................................................................... 72
Cloud Data Limitations ..................................................................................................... 75
General Trends .................................................................................................................. 82
Location Data Recovery and Evaluation Strategy .................................................................. 90
Limitations and Future Research ........................................................................................... 94
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION............................................................................................ 97
APPENDIX A: TEST SESSION WORKSHEET .................................................................... 101
APPENDIX B: APPS AND SETTINGS INFORMATION ..................................................... 103
APPENDIX C: TEST SESSIONS ........................................................................................... 105
APPENDIX D: ANALYSIS TOOLS ...................................................................................... 108
vii

APPENDIX E: POSSIBLE KEYWORD SEARCH TERMS ................................................... 110
APPENDIX F: SQLITE QUERIES USED .............................................................................. 112
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 116

viii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 - Cell Tower Localization Errors by Environment ....................................................... 19
Figure 2 - Relative Error Range by Resource Type .................................................................... 22
Figure 3 - Cloud Analyzer Location History Options (30-day range) ......................................... 39
Figure 4 - RunKeeper Permissions from “Packages.xml” with “ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION”45
Figure 5 - RunKeeper.sqlite database, trips table ....................................................................... 49
Figure 6 - RunKeeper.sqlite database, points table..................................................................... 50
Figure 7 - RunKeeper.sqlite database, query converting timestamps and combining content from
trips and points tables ................................................................................................................ 50
Figure 8 - RunKeeper.sqlite database, query results ................................................................... 51
Figure 9 - Contents of the Locate My Friends app's "messaging.db" database as viewed within
Physical Analyzer (coordinates rounded to nearest degree)........................................................ 54
Figure 10 - Contents of the Locate My Friends app's "messaging.db" database as viewed within
SQLite Studio (more precise coordinates) ................................................................................. 54
Figure 11 - Contents of the Locate My Friends app's "360LocationDB" database, SQLite query
results. High precision coordinates noted, but less precise than those associated with messages
found in "messaging.db." .......................................................................................................... 55
Figure 12 - Content of the Field Trip app's "lastLocation.xml" file ............................................ 57
Figure 13 - Content of the Field Trip app's "lastNotification.xml" file ....................................... 58
Figure 14 - Navigation request from Waze app's "waze_log.txt" text file ................................... 60
Figure 15 - Content of web browser's "https_www.google.com_0.localstorage" database,
showing search terms, location coordinates, and timestamps ..................................................... 61
ix

Figure 16 - Content of AccuWeather app's "accuwx_locations" file........................................... 63
Figure 17 - Content of AccuWeather app's "accuwx_geocoder_cache" file ................................ 63
Figure 18 - Content of Words With Friends app's "iad.dat" file, showing latitude and longitude
values and connection type ........................................................................................................ 64
Figure 19 - Sample entry from "dumpLogsDatabase" file .......................................................... 67
Figure 20 - Contents of the QuizUp game's "mixpanel" database showing WLAN network state
with timestamp .......................................................................................................................... 68
Figure 21 - Content of the "ContextLog_0.db" database, filtered to show Waze app activity ..... 71
Figure 22 - Geo-tagged photo example latitude and longitude accuracy check ........................... 73
Figure 23- Content of the "googlesettings.db" database ............................................................. 75
Figure 24 - Content of the "accounts.db" database ..................................................................... 76
Figure 25 - Cloud Analyzer (left) and RunKeeper (right) location data for same timeframe ....... 78
Figure 26 - Google user account interface content management................................................. 79
Figure 27 - Option to save timeframe as KML file via Google user account web interface ........ 80
Figure 28 - Comparison of cached coordinates for same timeframe from RunKeeper (purple),
Google user location history (yellow), and Cloud Analyzer (cyan) ............................................ 81
Figure 29 - Actual versus Cloud location with cellular service only (error of over 1.5 kilometers)
................................................................................................................................................. 83
Figure 30 - Actual, Device, & Cloud locations with all sensors active (errors from 5 to 45
meters) ...................................................................................................................................... 84
Figure 31 - Map My Walk device (green) versus cloud (red) locations ...................................... 85
Figure 32 - Location Tracker device data (yellow) versus cloud data (magenta) - no GNSS ...... 86

x

Figure 33 - Location Tracker device data (purple) versus cloud data (green) - with GNSS......... 86
Figure 34 - Device versus actual versus cloud locations in urban environment without GNSS ... 87
Figure 35 - Device (purple) versus cloud (green) locations in urban environment with GNSS ... 88
Figure 36 - Google Maps directions artifacts recovered via Strings command utility from
"gmm_storage.db" database ...................................................................................................... 91
Figure 37 - Timestamp from Google Maps "gmm_storage.db" database directions search record
................................................................................................................................................. 92

xi

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 - Android Application Location Requests ..................................................................... 12
Table 2 - Factors Affecting Cell Tower Activity ........................................................................ 17
Table 3 - Strategies for Recovery of Location Data from Android Devices ................................ 25
Table 4 - Test Device Information ............................................................................................. 33
Table 5 - Average Cloud Location Frequency ........................................................................... 41
Table 6 - Databases of Interest .................................................................................................. 47
Table 7 - Selection of content recovered from Viber app's "viber_messages" database as reported
by Internet Evidence Finder ...................................................................................................... 52
Table 8 - Selection of content recovered from Facebook Messenger app's "threads_db2" database
as reported by CelleBrite Physical Analyzer .............................................................................. 53
Table 9 - Content of Foursquare's "fsq.db" database, extracted via SQLite query....................... 56
Table 10- Destination data extracted from the Waze app's "user.db" database, RECENTS and
PLACES tables, using SQLite query .......................................................................................... 58
Table 11 - Turn-by-turn directions recovered from Waze app's "tts.db" database, using SQLite
query......................................................................................................................................... 59
Table 12 - OneWeather app's "oneweather.db" cached locations, from geocodes table, showing
device location history .............................................................................................................. 62
Table 13 - AccuWeather app's "accu_forecast.db" database content showing stored userconfigured location, not actual device location .......................................................................... 62
Table 14 - Examples of connection types logged in the Amazon app's "event" database that are
not consistent with test session documentation .......................................................................... 69
xii

Table 15 - Excerpt of the Google Mobile Services' "herrevad" database showing WLAN network
connection details ...................................................................................................................... 70
Table 16 - LG VS870 geo-tagged photos, average accuracy ...................................................... 74
Table 17 - OnePlus One A0001 geo-tagged photos, average accuracy ....................................... 74
Table 18 - Recovery and evaluation strategies ........................................................................... 93
Table 19 - Apps and Settings Information ............................................................................... 104
Table 20 - Test Session Information ........................................................................................ 106
Table 21 - Analysis tools used in this study ............................................................................. 109
Table 22 - Suggested keywords for recovery of metadata, application code, or sensor activity 111
Table 23 - SQLite query details ............................................................................................... 113

xiii

LIST OF ACRONYMS (or) ABBREVIATIONS
ADB

Android Debugging Bridge

API

Application Programming Interface

BLOB

Binary Large OBject

BSSID

Basic Service Set Identifier

CDMA

Code Division Multiple Access

FCC

Federal Communications Commission

GLONASS

Globalnaya Navigazionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema, or Global Navigation
Satellite System

GNSS

Global Navigation Satellite System

GPS

Global Positioning System

GREP

Globally search a Regular Expression and Print

GSM

Global System for Mobile

ISP

In-System Programming

JPG

Joint Photographic Experts Group

JTAG

Joint Test Action Group

MAC

Media Access Control

OS

Operating System

P.A.

Physical Analyzer

SIM

Subscriber Identity Module

SQLite

Structured Query Language Lite

SSID

Service Set Identifier

UTC

Coordinated Universal Time

WLAN

Wireless Local Area Network

XML

Extensible Markup Language

xiv

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices have become pervasive throughout modern society and everyday life. As
the devices have increased in proliferation, they have likewise improved in capabilities. They
essentially function as pocket-sized computers, with full operating systems and the ability to
install and run additional applications. Their hardware features have expanded to move beyond
the transmission of voice and text content to include multimedia, internet browsing and
streaming, location awareness, and navigation functionalities. This enrichment of features and
capabilities has further entrenched the mobile device into everyday life for many, whether it be
checking email or searching for a restaurant nearby.
Leaving aside the sociological implications of this heightened connectivity and
convenience phenomenon, the frequency and intimate nature of use by the mobile device owner
make them rich sources of data about an individual’s interests, activity, relationships, and
communication. Naturally, this makes the mobile device a particularly valuable source of
evidence in both criminal and civil investigations. Because users interact so often and so
personally with their devices, their content may be of interest even in less obvious cases, where
the incident does not directly involve the use of the device but the device may still hold
information that could inform the investigation or adjudication of the case.
In particular, the location-awareness of mobile devices means they could store or
generate historical location data that may document the device’s, and by extension, the user’s,
whereabouts during a particular timeframe of interest in the case. Such data, if recovered and
identified, could corroborate the accounts of witnesses in the case or implicate a suspect or even
assist in the recovery of a missing person. Of course, much depends on the reliability of any such
1

cached location information, as well as an examiner’s ability to recover and interpret it from a
particular device.
This paper will elaborate on the investigative role of mobile device location data and
review existing research pertaining to the capabilities and data recovery efforts specifically
involving Android devices and location information. The study focuses on criminal
investigations in particular, but the concepts and methodologies presented would apply in civil
contexts, as well. It further aims to address the complex nature of such recovery and
interpretation by utilizing test devices in controlled conditions and examining the data extracted
from the devices for evaluation of accuracy via comparison with the documented location
history. It also examines the emerging role of cloud resources and presents test device cloud data
retrieved for this study. Informed by the test findings, a general strategy for analysis of Android
devices for location data will be presented, as will a discussion of limitations and
recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

Proliferation and Utilization of Mobile Devices
According to the Pew Research Center (2014), a majority of American adults (58%) own
a smartphone, and 29% of them identify their device as a necessity which they cannot imagine
doing without. A separate report focusing on Internet users found that 80% of online adults
possess a smartphone, spending an average of 1.85 hours per day online via their mobile device.
Android-based devices comprise the largest market share at 54% (Mander, 2014), while also
boasting high growth rates in emerging markets and a large app base of over 200,000
downloadable, third-party apps (Maus, Hofken, & Schuba, 2011). Android is an open-source
mobile device operating system developed and maintained by Google.
Empirically, it is clear that smartphones have become an entrenched and intimate part of
daily life in the modern world. Pew (2014) reports that 44% of cell phone owners have slept with
their phone next to their bed. Just over a third of U.S. households utilize a cell phone in lieu of a
landline, and individuals carry their phones with them everywhere and use them in a myriad of
ways. As a society, we have come to rely on these devices not just for communication, but also
to get directions, coordinate schedules, and even make purchases (Wells, 2014). Smartphones
have clearly evolved into more complex and powerful tools. Such developments prompted the
Washington State Senate Judiciary Committee to ask in 2012, “Have [mobile devices] also
effectively become tracking devices (State of Washington Senate Judiciary Committee, 2012)?”
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Certainly, there are those who would see the advantages of this, at least in some
circumstances. Senator Charles Schumer has called for the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) to implement improvement plans for emergency call tracking of cell phones,
noting that 70% of 911 calls now come from a cell phone (Fox, 2015). He recounted an incident
from his state of New York, in which an elderly woman called 911 from a cell phone after
having a stroke. Because her speech was slurred due to the stroke, she was unable to provide her
address to the dispatcher. An address was obtained based on which cell tower(s) she was
connected to during the call. The address proved inaccurate, however, and it was 8 hours before
responders managed to find her. She died the next day (Schumer, 2015).
The big U.S. carriers (Verizon, AT&T, Sprint, and T-Mobile) pledged their commitment
to a goal of providing precise location data to 911 dispatchers for 40% of cell phone 911 calls
within two years, and 80% within six years. The FCC suggests this specific location information
should be accurate within 50 meters horizontally and 3 meters vertically. The proposed method
for achieving this level of accuracy involves the incorporation of nearby, static Bluetooth and
WLAN-enabled devices, such as smoke detectors or wireless routers, which will be logged with
a precise location in a special emergency services database. Carriers also plan to ensure that
handset WLAN and Bluetooth functionality can be enabled remotely in an emergency, if they are
disabled (Selyukh, 2014).
Other aims involving smartphones as tracking devices are less consequential, perhaps,
but may be just as sensitive. Marketing companies, such as Path Intelligence (PI), claim to be
able to detect phones entering their client’s business, recording the frequency and duration of
their visits, as well as the typical routes they take from business to business. PI markets this
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technology to shopping malls. However, this obviously involves the collection of shoppers’
location information, likely without their knowledge or consent, and then using that data for
profit (Michael, 2013).
On the more altruistic end of the spectrum, some researchers have focused on the
potential use of smartphones as a low-cost tracking device for Alzheimer patients. The devices
often combine GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) functionality with internet access, so
providers or caregivers could use a web-based application to monitor current or past location
information for the patients (Paiva & Abreu, 2012). So the concept of using smartphones to
monitor users’ locations has been embraced from multiple perspectives.
Even smartphone users themselves often use their devices as tracking devices, as a
convenience. A study published in 2010 of almost 50,000 Android apps showed that 40% of the
apps utilize the device location (Maus et al., 2011). Apps like Gas Buddy, Yelp, Waze, and Back
Country Navigator allow users to find products or services nearby, navigate to them, and even
use their devices as GPS guides in remote places (Reisinger, 2013). Pew (2014) reported that
74% of smartphone owners had used their device to get directions, recommendations, or some
other location-based information, with 12% saying they had used their device to “check in” at a
particular location or to share their whereabouts with friends/family. Some apps market this
location sharing feature as a public safety measure, allowing parents to monitor their children’s
locations.
As another interested party on public safety matters, law enforcement also explores the
use of mobile devices for tracking purposes. Given the intimate nature of the devices and the fact
that over 6 billion cell phone subscriptions exist in the world (Wells, 2014), law enforcement
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interest in such functionality is unsurprising. In discussing the usage of cell phones as tracking
devices by law enforcement, Wells also noted that cell phone carriers informed Congress that
they collectively received 1.3 million requests for customer information in 2011. This involved
both real-time tracking and historical information on cell site connections obtained from the
carrier. Both of these practices will be explored in greater detail later in the paper, in terms of
how they are implemented as well as existing research on their reliability.
These descriptions of smartphone roles in law enforcement, emergency response,
marketing, user convenience, and even healthcare emphasize their ubiquity and the depth to
which they have permeated modern life. Their internet connectivity and location awareness have
been powerful contributors to these developments. The next section explores the technological
features that enable these functions.

Device Capabilities and Location Awareness
Indeed, mobile devices come equipped with a substantial arsenal of hardware sensors and
transmitters to facilitate location awareness, augmented by web-based services operated by
various private and public entities. This section of the paper will examine these resources and
their role in sustaining location-based services in Android devices.
The State of Washington Senate Judiciary Committee (2012) identified four key ways
mobile devices may determine a user’s location: GNSS, cellular network information, WLAN
access points, and users themselves. A review of the first three of these resources will
demonstrate their relative strengths and weaknesses, followed by a discussion of the services that
supplement the hardware-based abilities of the device.
6

Before evaluating the utility of GNSS, more detail on its components and operation is
warranted. GNSS is a relatively newer term used to encompass all potential satellite systems a
device may use, since the activation of the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System
(GLONASS) toppled the exclusivity previously held by the U.S.-operated Global Positioning
System (GPS). Other satellite systems operated by other entities or nations are emerging, but
thus far, these are the two commonly used in U.S. devices (Last, 2015). Throughout this paper,
when the term “GNSS” is used, it refers to GPS and GLONASS. Where a cited study strictly
refers only to “GPS,” the term GPS will be used.
The GPS network includes 27 operational satellites and has been operating for over 30
years (State of Washington Senate Judiciary Committee, 2012). Alternatively, GLONASS
utilizes 23 operational satellites as of January 2012 (Cai, 2013). Both operate in similar fashion,
via trilateration. The device receives signals from as many satellites as it can, then measures the
distance between each satellite based on the time each satellite’s signal takes to travel to the
device, in order to determine its precise location. Devices do not actively transmit their location
(Last, 2015). Since both systems require line-of-sight paths between at least three satellites and
the terrestrial devices utilizing them, they are subject to some limitations. Specifically, it can take
a significant amount of time to get signals from enough satellites, and signals may be degraded
or blocked entirely if there are atmospheric interferences or solar activity, topographical
obstructions, or if the device is being used indoors or underground (Michael, 2013). In short, the
big factor in the accuracy or utility of GNSS services is the surroundings (Last, 2015).
Additional constraints are more fundamental: sensors are not present in all cell phones (though
certainly in most if not all smartphones); the process requires a lot of power, draining the device
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battery quickly; due to the power concerns, the sensor(s) are not typically enabled by default and
must be activated by the user. On the plus side, when GNSS services are used successfully, the
data is typically extremely accurate and often includes additional detail on speed, altitude, and
direction of travel, or bearing (Lifchitz, 2010).
Cellular network strategies typically present the opposite traits. All cellular phones
possess the necessary transceiver, so additional hardware is not required. Furthermore, the
function is typically enabled by default and consumes significantly less battery power, provided
cellular network coverage is adequate. Cellular coverage continues to expand and improve in the
United States, with over 280,000 cell sites in use as of June 2012. The tradeoff usually involves
accuracy. In rural areas, where cell site towers are sometimes miles apart, accuracy tends to be
less than in urban areas, which have higher tower densities (Wells, 2014). Other factors affecting
the reliability of cellular network location data will be detailed later in the paper.
Since every cell tower is uniquely identified and carriers maintain location information
on each of their towers, the towers with which a phone communicates provide the basis for
tracking its location. When a phone is on and the cellular service is enabled, the phone will
attempt to connect to a tower as often as every 7 seconds (State of Washington Senate Judiciary
Committee, 2012). Phones will often communicate with multiple towers simultaneously or
within very short amounts of time. In these instances, a more precise location for the device may
be obtained via triangulation. This process may be activated and tracked remotely from the
network side, unlike GNSS, in a process known as “pinging” (Lifchitz, 2010). So in an
emergency, for example, responders can utilize carrier resources to activate the device’s E911
system, which will then use the cellular network pinging process or even activate the phone’s
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GNSS service. The device can then obtain precise GNSS coordinates, if available, and then
transmit them to emergency services via the carrier’s network to help guide responders to the
right place (Daniel, 2014).
The last of the hardware-based tools involves WLAN networks. This is actually a sort of
hybrid approach, because it involves the use of network-based geolocation services. The
technique involves the detection of nearby WLAN access points, along with their relative signal
strengths (Brouwers & Woehrle, 2012), followed by a query of a remotely stored database
containing location information associated with the particular access point’s media access
control (MAC) address (State of Washington Senate Judiciary Committee, 2012). Theoretically,
it could circumvent this remote query process if the MAC address-location information were
stored locally on the device, as some third-party apps billed as “WLAN hotspot finders” purport
to do. In either case, the benefits of the WLAN method typically involve lower power
consumption, no performance detriment indoors, and decent accuracy. However, WLAN
connectivity must also be enabled by the user, relies on the presence of access points (or other
nearby hardware tracked in the queried database, such as cell towers, Bluetooth devices like
smoke detectors, etc. [24]), and may not be as accurate as GNSS location results (Lifchitz, 2010).
The discussion of WLAN-based methods introduced the extended functionality offered
by remotely operated services. A key provider of the aforementioned remote location lookup
services is Google itself, which maintains a database supported by the “anonymous” collection of
geographic data for cell tower or WLAN routers to which its users are connected. By opting to
use Google’s Location Services, users agree to contribute to this database (4RENSIKER, 2012).
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The Google location database is thus vast and constantly updated, receiving data from Google’s
cars (street view and automated) and of course, Android phones (Lifchitz, 2010).
Android devices have built-in application programming interfaces (APIs) for location
services developed and maintained by Google. Both stock Android apps and third-party apps use
these services (Davydov, 2011). The location API may use any of the previously described
resources to obtain device location, depending on the availability of the resource, as well as the
parameters of the particular app. Apps may be programmed to request the current device
location, receive updates on the location, look up addresses from detected device latitude and
longitude (this process is known as reverse geocoding), or perform geofencing or activity
recognition (“Making your app,” 2015). Geofencing involves the caching of location history of
the device or recognition of a particular location, in order to provide additional context-based
functionality, such as reminding a user of some task when they arrive home (Maus et al., 2011).
Google’s application development tutorials offer some insight into the functionality of
their own location services API, the fused location provider. Specifically, app developers must
not only code for the location functions described above, but they must also ensure their app
contains the appropriate permissions to do so. Location permissions come in two flavors: coarse
and fine, with fine being the more precise of the two. The permission level and the details of the
location request determine the accuracy of the information obtained via Google’s location
services (“Making your app,” 2015). The 2010 study of Android apps showed that of the 50,000
reviewed, 25% of the apps requested permission to the device coarse location, and 15%
requested permission to the fine location. Examples of such apps include Facebook, Foursquare,
and Twitter, as well as more obvious tools like mapping and navigation apps (Maus et al., 2011).
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Indeed, the Android development tutorial offers an enticing pitch to developers to include
location-based features in their app development tutorial (“Making your app,” 2015), noting the
following:
If your app can continuously track location, it can deliver more relevant information to
the user. For example, if your app helps the user find their way while walking or driving,
or if your app tracks the location of assets, it needs to get the location of the device at
regular intervals. As well as the geographical location (latitude and longitude), you may
want to give the user further information such as the bearing (horizontal direction of
travel), altitude, or velocity of the device. (p. 5)
This statement offers further insight into the capabilities and strategies of the device. It
suggests that location information may be routinely updated at configurable intervals, with the
update rate having reliability implications. It also implies that GNSS technology may be used,
with its references to latitude and longitude, bearing, altitude, and velocity. Furthermore, it
suggests some good application types to use for studying this topic, specifically navigation and
tracking apps, in addition to those apps already mentioned.
The tutorial goes on to lay out how developers code for this type of functionality. First,
developers must ensure their applications have the proper permissions, as discussed previously.
Coarse permissions are described as yielding locations with maximum accuracy within
approximately one city block, while fine permissions are needed for functions requiring greater
precision (“Making your app,” 2015). Permissions are disclosed to the user when they attempt to
download or update an app from the Google Play market, and they must accept these in order for
the download to proceed (State of Washington Senate Judiciary Committee, 2012). Later, we
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will examine how this arrangement figures into issues of user awareness and consent in terms of
device location capabilities and monitoring.
Having secured the proper permissions, developers must then program their app to
request the device location. This may be done a single time, to request the device’s last known
location, or it may be configured to receive regular location updates. The parameters of any of
these location requests will affect the accuracy of the information, dictating the update interval
and the priority level. The table below summarizes the different request types, as described in the
Android developer tutorial (“Making your app,” 2015).
Table 1 - Android Application Location Requests
Request Type

Description

Balanced

Considered coarse-level (max accuracy within 100 meters)
Likely to use WLAN and cell towers to obtain device location, depending
on availability
Most precise
When used with fast update interval of 5 seconds, this request type can
return information accurate within a few feet
More likely to use GNSS
Appropriate for mapping/navigation apps
Consumes less power
City-level precision, accurate to within 10 kilometers
Receive updates when available as other apps request location updates
Accuracy dependent on permissions/request details of other application(s)

High accuracy

Low power
No power

The varying options for the location requests themselves reflect the inherent inverse
relationship between accuracy prioritization and battery life, as well as the developers’ desire to
balance the two. High accuracy requires high power consumption. There would also seem to be
some correlation between these request parameter types and the app permission details. Indeed,
in order for the high accuracy parameter to be implemented, an app must have permission to the

12

device fine location (“Making your app,” 2015). This implies that applications without such
permissions may be less reliable sources of location data, when examining artifacts recovered
from the device itself. This hypothesis helps shape the strategy of this study and will figure in the
review of study findings.
The Android tutorial essentially states that the fused location provider updates apps
periodically with the best available location, and that the accuracy of the information depends on
the active sensors (i.e., cellular, WLAN, GNSS), the location permissions, and the options in the
app’s location request (“Making your app,” 2015). Thus, beyond identifying app types that may
be of interest, the tutorial’s description of the fused location provider’s features might also
suggest strategies for analyzing the data associated with those apps. For example, if applications
log timestamped metadata about their activity, a review of this data could provide some insight
into how reliable any associated, cached location information may be, by documenting its
location request activity and details. This study’s methodology will include a search for such
metadata.
Clearly, the devices have many resources and many purposes involving location
information. To date, much of the research involving the location-awareness features of Android
phones has focused on the accuracy of tracking a live device as well as the review of historical
cell site data obtained from cell phone carriers for a particular user. However, from a forensics
perspective, many crimes are not reported or known until well after the incident, leaving
investigators with a device seized later from an identified suspect and rendering live tracking
moot. Furthermore, historical cell site data may not be accessible, or as we shall see in
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subsequent sections, entirely reliable. Thus, the impetus and motivation for this study involves
the recovery and reliability evaluation of the data recovered from the device itself.

Existing Research on Location Data Recovery and Reliability
Maus et al. (2011) noted that in general, locations derived by smartphones are generally
quite accurate, in most cases. Empirically, this would make sense, since companies want users to
enjoy and rely on their products, but it of course implies that the accuracy varies under different
conditions. This section of the paper reviews the existing research on accuracy associated with
device location services, as well as the recovery and reliability of the data recovered from the
devices themselves.

Accuracy of Device Location Services
Much prior study has targeted the live tracking of devices, rather than data recovered
from the devices after the incident. Even though this study focuses on the analysis of data
recovered from the devices themselves, these works still inform the study methodology and
shape hypotheses. Part of this work’s aims involve an assessment of the accuracy trends noted in
live tracking with regard to location resources such as cellular data versus GNSS, for example. If
these trends do hold, it will place a higher priority on developing strategies for reviewing device
data to determine which resources were active when the recovered data was cached, or
evaluating if such a determination is even feasible at all.
In an excerpt from his upcoming book, Cellular Location Evidence for Legal
Professionals, Larry Daniel (2014) states that two fundamental options exist for tracking a
14

device in real-time: activate the device GPS and request information via pings from the carrier
side or triangulate the location using the cellular network. Daniel describes GPS as accurate to
within 50 feet, while noting that triangulation demands three reference points and can err by up
to several thousand feet. Each of these techniques has its own set of benefits and limitations.
As noted earlier, GNSS-based services drain battery power quickly, require time and line
of sight with several satellites to fix the device location, and can be subject to interference by
atmospheric conditions, buildings and trees, or radio activity/jamming. On the other hand, the
U.S. government reports that the civilian GPS service offers accuracy within 7.8 meters with a
95% confidence level, making it an exceptionally accurate resource (Michael, 2013). Given that
this service is now being used in conjunction with the Russian GLONASS system in newer
devices, the effective accuracy may be even greater. Plus, as Professor David Last (2015) notes,
GNSS services also often log additional metadata beyond just latitude and longitude information,
including quality (accuracy) information, altitude, speed, and bearing. This additional metadata,
if cached on the device, may be of use in evaluating the reliability of the recovered location
history. This idea will be incorporated into this study’s evaluation of test results.
Last (2015) also points out that an examiner can always check if the recovered
coordinates make sense, lining up with travel routes or roads, for example. Furthermore, the
precision of the coordinates and altitude may also offer some insight. For example, a decimal
GPS coordinate with hundredths-level precision (two places after the decimal) is accurate to
within 1,111.1 meters, but a coordinate with ten thousandths-level precision (four places after the
decimal) can pinpoint locations within 11.1 meters. Too many places after the decimal point,
however, may indicate that a particular coordinate is dubious or fabricated, because consumer-

15

level technology in mobile devices is not typically capable of resolving locations to that level of
precision (Bairstow, 2015). Since altitude is typically less accurate than latitude and longitude
values, if the altitude seems quite accurate, the latitude and longitude data should be very
reliable. Also, since one of the known GNSS issues involves atmospheric interference, an
examiner can check for unusual solar activity at the time in question, as solar activity is welltracked and documented by multiple entities.
This latest point highlights another way GNSS and cellular-based location features differ,
in that at least a number of GNSS limitations can be evaluated after the fact, such as the solar
activity or the topography of the region in question. However, a few major caveats apply to the
use of cellular tower connections to locate a device, whether in a live tracking situation or in an
effort to reconstruct location traces from historical cell site records obtained from the carrier.
The primary issue arises from the assumption that a device will connect to the tower(s)
nearest its current location. This assumption is problematic for a number of reasons. For multiple
reasons, cell tower coverage varies and may not be known for a given time. Phones will connect
to the tower with the best signal at the time, but since multiple factors affect cellular signals, that
tower may not necessarily be the closest (Daniel, 2014). Some of the factors involve the tower
infrastructure and operation, the local environment, and even the devices themselves (Wells,
2014). The table below summarizes the various factors affecting phone-cell tower interaction.
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Table 2 - Factors Affecting Cell Tower Activity
Cellular Network/Operations

Environmental

Device

Number of cell sites
Ongoing maintenance or repairs
Height of tower
Height of tower above sea level
Wattage output
Range of coverage
Number of antennas per tower
Direction and height of antennas
Call traffic via each antenna at
time of connection
Interference from other towers
or radio signals

Weather
Topography (hills, trees, etc.)
Urban structures (buildings,
signs, etc.)
Time of day

Wattage output
Broadband capability (age of
phone)
Indoor/outdoor at time of use

In cases of live tracking, these complicating factors may be rendered moot when the
device is actually located, but in cases involving historical cell site data, Daniel (2014) asserts
that because of these issues, it is not possible to know the coverage area of a cell tower at the
time of a particular event, nor is it possible to recreate exactly the conditions under which the
event occurred, in terms of the cell coverage and operation. Furthermore, even if carriers
maintain the location of each of their towers, one cannot know from the carrier’s records if the
recorded tower was actually the one closest to the phone at the time. For example, even if a
tower is closest, it may be inundated with heavy call traffic during peak activity times, forcing a
phone to connect to a tower further away. These issues have significant implications for the use
of these historical carrier records in the adjudication of criminal cases, as will be discussed in the
next section of the paper.
In terms of the accuracy of the cellular-based location derivations, varying results have
been obtained. By working off just the single tower connected to and referring to carrier
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maintained locations associated with that tower, accuracy levels within 100 to 3000 meters have
been assessed. Triangulation techniques, available when a device communicates with multiple
towers simultaneously or in rapid succession, have produced accuracy levels as precise as 25
meters (Maus et al., 2011). How are these assessments performed, though?
Yang et al. (2010) highlight the technique of wardriving, wherein “a vehicle drives within
the target area recording signals emanating from nearby cell towers (or WLAN access points)
and the locations these signals were received at.” They then use various mathematical strategies
to infer the location of the various towers and access points detected during the collection phase.
By comparing these inferred locations to the known locations of the towers in question, they
evaluate the accuracy levels.
Yang et al. (2010) performed their own wardriving effort around Los Angeles, an area of
roughly 1396 square kilometers covered by 54 cell towers at the time. The team collected data,
measuring signal strengths every two seconds as they drove around the area for a period of two
months in 2009. Having gathered their data, they used techniques to infer locations of the towers
they detected and compared the results to the known tower locations they had documented. They
then developed their own supplemental mathematical strategies to refine those results, in an
attempt to establish a way of improving the reliability of location data inferred from cellular
tower interactions. The figure below provides a visual representation of the improvements to
accuracy they were able to achieve via their innovative post-processing, as well as a quick
comparison of the variations in accuracy among different environments, namely rural,
residential, or urban areas (Yang et al., 2010).
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Figure 1 - Cell Tower Localization Errors by Environment

From these results, it would appear that cellular location information may be fairly
reliable, generally much more so in urban and residential areas than in rural areas. Other
researchers seem to corroborate this generalization, describing accuracy estimates as being
within 50 to 100 meters in urban areas and some hundreds of meters elsewhere (Michael, 2013).
Another study focused on identifying when a user is “dwelling,” or stationary, by
tracking the user’s mobile device. Such concerns may figure in multiple contexts, from military
operations to marketing strategies. The researchers created a custom Android application and
collected information from five different devices with seven users. Users were directed to enable
various settings at certain times and to track their own movements throughout their use of the
devices. These researchers looked beyond cell towers and focused on the addition of GPS and
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WLAN resources, as well as geolocation services, like Google location services or rival provider
Skyhook (Brouwers & Woehrle, 2012).
As might be expected, these researchers found that tracking information was most
accurate when all of the aforementioned resources were involved, meaning GPS and WLAN
sensors were enabled and access to geolocation services was facilitated. Again, geolocation
services use the detected WLAN access points and signal strengths to query a remote database,
which returns a location and estimate of accuracy based on the query information. The
researchers noted that the best results typically involved the use of this service, although the
quality of such information depends on the accuracy of the database and how many WLAN
access points are actually in range at particular place. They found that static users would
sometimes appear to jump between two points over 100 meters apart within seconds, as signals
were detected and lost, etc. They also found that users moving at constant speed would appear to
have clumped locations along their tracked route, rather than continuous travel, likely a sign that
devices revert to most recent previously detected location when no new signal is detected.
Furthermore, the use of geolocation services comes with a cost in terms of power consumption
versus cellular only, especially if the rate of the queries is increased (Brouwers & Woehrle,
2012).
But how are these geolocation service databases developed? Who maintains them? How
is their accuracy evaluated and improved?
The “dwelling” researchers highlighted two key points that offer some response to these
questions and also serve to guide some of the methodology of this study. First, they noted that
Google’s geolocation service boasts reliable accuracy and extensive coverage. Secondly, they
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offer some insight to its operation. According to Brouwers and Woehrle (2012), “Google trains
its database using a background service built into Android devices that reports GPS coordinates
and WLAN scan results to their servers at regular intervals” (p. 667).
This indicates that Google’s database is likely to be extremely well-maintained, given the
abundance of Android users and their ongoing participation in contributing to its improvement. It
further suggests that Android users may not be particularly cognizant of their role in this
maintenance effort, since it is a background service that is built into the devices that facilitates
the activity. So does Google actually have a vast repository of location history information
associated with its Android customers, and is that information at all accessible? Those questions
also guided this study’s methodology and will be addressed in the study findings.
However, other geolocation services, such as Skyhook (Brouwers & Woehrle, 2012), for
example, certainly cannot enjoy Google’s access to Android user location updates. There are
other ways of building geolocation databases, though. The aforementioned technique of
wardriving may be employed. Service users may also contribute known location/access point
information directly to the provider, as with Skyhook (Skyhook, 2015). Via wardriving,
voluntary user contributions, and in Google’s case, Android background location services,
various providers have been able to build geolocation service databases (Michael, 2013).
Having elaborated on how the geolocation services are developed, operated, and
maintained, the question turns to their reliability. One study evaluated Skyhook’s service,
contrasting the company’s claims of 10-meter accuracy with results closer to 63-meter averages
in Sydney, Australia, and 43 to 92 meters in Las Vegas, Miami, and San Diego (Michael, 2013).
Yang et al. (2010) reference a study regarding wardriving and WLAN access points that found
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that the estimated access point locations have a median error of 40 meters. Another group noted
that WLAN access point locations can change (Davydov, 2011). However, Brouwers and
Woehrle (2012) generally found geolocation services to be fairly accurate, especially when used
in conjunction with other resources like GPS.
In summary, a review of the existing work involving smartphone location resources and
their accuracy indicates a broad range of reliability estimates, from a few meters for GNSS
information to a few kilometers for positions obtained via a single cell tower connection. The
chart below offers a visual representation of the relative error ranges by resource type, with
cellular on the order of thousands of meters, GNSS way down in the single to double digits, and
WLAN resources overlapping between the two. Part of this study’s objectives will be to
determine if any such accuracy trends are noted in the testing.

Relative Error Range by Resource Type (Meters)

Cell

25

WiFi

10

GNSS

7.8

1000+

100

16

Figure 2 - Relative Error Range by Resource Type
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Recovery of Location Data from Devices
Studies related to location data recovered from the devices themselves appeared
somewhat limited in scope and become dated quickly due to the fast-paced evolution of devices
and applications, but they do offer some instructive insight. Various strategies are described by
different researchers. Some are more direct than others, as the subsequent discussion will show.
Several works mentioned the need to “root” a device to extract all of the data (Davydov,
2011; Kroger & Creutzberg, 2012; Maus, Hofken, & Schuba, 2011; Racioppo & Murthy, 2012;
Sack, Kroger, & Creutzberg, 2012). The term “root” refers to the process of obtaining
administrative, or root, access to the device’s operating system. This enables greater user control
of the phone’s functionality and files, and it also ensures a forensic examiner the ability to obtain
a complete raw image of the device’s internal memory (Racioppo & Murthy, 2012). Statistics on
just what percentage of Android users root their phones proved elusive, but the process is
specific to each particular make and model of the device, sometimes even varying depending on
the device firmware version as well (Riley, 2015).
Also highlighted by multiple researchers are two files associated with older versions of
Android, and therefore, older devices: cache.cell and cache.wifi (4RENSIKER, 2012; Kroger &
Creutzberg, 2012; Yi, 2012). These files stored the 50 most recently detected cell tower locations
and 200 most recent WLAN network locations, respectively. The information was timestamped,
as well (4RENSIKER, 2012). However, researchers also noted that these files would only be
populated with information if the user had enabled two specific settings which are not active by
default (Kroger & Creutzberg, 2012). Furthermore, the files would only maintain the information
up to the previously stated maximum record number, or for fourteen days (4RENSIKER, 2012).
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Instead of focusing on specific files of interest, some chose to hone in on certain file
types, specifically SQLite databases and certain picture files. Racioppo and Murphy (2012) stress
that SQLite databases are among the most important features of a smartphone, for forensic
purposes, storing the bulk of the application data for Android apps. Among others, Yi (2012)
discusses geo-tagged photos, images captured by the device’s camera that contain embedded
latitude and longitude information. However, Yi also offers the more novel approach for photos
of possible interest that are not geo-tagged: upload the image in question to Google Image search
to find possibly similar images that are geo-tagged. More conventionally, Sack, Kroger, and
Creutzberg (2012) also point out the potential value of Google Maps’ map tiles, which are
snapshots of map images viewed via the application.
Other examiners targeted specific apps, or categories of apps. For example, Saliba (2013)
identifies the Facebook and Facebook Messenger apps as specific sources of location data,
noting that the “threads_db2” database(s) associated with these apps store latitude and longitude
values, along with altitude and speed, along with users’ message content. Maus et al. (2011)
highlight other apps, such as Google Maps, Foursquare, and Twitter, as well as database content
recovered from a weather app and a navigation app. Sack et al. (2012) also mention cookies and
databases associated with the device’s web browser app. Davydov (2011) extends the
consideration to all location-aware apps, naming example categories like navigation, social
networking, weather, travel services, and banking.
Finally, when the traditional avenues of exploring known file types and applications of
likely interest have been exhausted, the task shifts to identifying more elusive types of location
artifacts. Artifacts stored as text addresses, points of interest, or navigation routes may require
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additional search techniques (Barmpatsolou, Damopoulos, Kambourakis, & Katos, 2013).
Strategies involve searching for geodata formats (GPS coordinates) or keywords like location,
latitude, longitude, or address (Maus et al., 2011). Davydov (2011) suggests looking for logged
MAC addresses of WLAN access points the device has detected, then looking up the associated
location. The table below summarizes the various strategies utilized by previous researchers for
recovering location data from Android devices.
Table 3 - Strategies for Recovery of Location Data from Android Devices
File Types

App Categories

Other

SQLite Databases
Pictures
Geo-tagged
Map tiles
Google Image Search

Navigation
Social networking
Weather
Travel
Banking

Text content
Addresses
Points of interest
Routes
Keywords
MAC addresses of WLAN access
points

While all of these insights are useful and certainly inform the methodology of this study,
little comment on the accuracy of any such recovered data was observed. Davydov (2011) offers
a discouraging assessment of prospects, noting that phones use cellular, GPS, and WLAN
resources collectively to get location information, and there is no way to determine how
particular data recovered from a device was obtained by that device. As an evaluation of his own
proffered method regarding cached MAC address lookup, he notes that any location estimate so
obtained may be of questionable accuracy. The relative lack of resolution regarding the
reliability of the location information recovered from Android devices factored heavily into the
motivation for this study.
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Use of Mobile Device Location Data in Criminal Cases
Of course, the reliability of mobile device location data would be of interest in criminal
cases where one or more of the parties involved used a smartphone during or around the incident.
Sisak (2012, p. 2) notes that “the technologies that make smartphones so ‘smart’ also make them
the closest thing law enforcement officers have to...homing devices.” Sisak also quotes one
detective who points out the potential boon that the increasingly ubiquitous smartphone has
brought investigators:
It only makes sense for us to look for digital evidence. A crime is committed. People
panic. They’re making calls. They’re sending text messages. All of that stuff is being
digitally recorded and it’s going to be great evidence for prosecuting a case. (p. 1)
The nature of who or what is recording the information becomes of interest. It could be
service providers, law enforcement or other parties actively tracking a live device, or it could be
cached by the device itself. Live tracking typically pertains to investigative operations, not
prosecution strategies, though courts have ruled that using a phone’s GPS capability to track
location does not require a warrant as law enforcement need no physical contact with the device
to facilitate such operations (Harvard Law Review, 2013). However, the remaining two of these
possibilities raises multifaceted concerns regarding the reliability and admissibility of the
information, leading to qualified conclusions about how it should be used in court.
The first category, data retrieved from service providers, has been the most studied and
arguably, the most controversial. The general process involves a few preliminary steps:
associating a device with a person of interest; identifying the phone carrier in question; and
serving some sort of legal process (i.e., search warrant, subpoena, etc.) on the carrier for the
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relevant call detail records. Then, an analyst examines the records and plots locations of cell
towers on a map, assigns a coverage area to each tower, then plots pie-shaped sectors that
represent possible locations from which particular cellular activity originated (Daniel, 2014). The
resulting maps may be presented in court as evidence of where an individual could have been at
or around the time of the crime, or to track past activity (Blank, 2011).
This practice has been targeted from various angles. Critics question everything from
how the records are obtained to their relevance and admissibility to their scientific validity. Even
service providers have weighed in on the discussions, with AT&T filing a friend-of-the-court
brief on a case involving records obtained via a court order, arguing that a search warrant should
be required. Whether due to AT&T’s intervention or not, the 11 th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that police do indeed need a search warrant for cellular location history (American Civil
Liberties Union, 2014). A number of efforts to require search warrants for such records have
been undertaken in courts and legislatures in California, Maryland, and Georgia. Though these
did not all succeed, Washington state attorneys, for their part, are now advising law enforcement
to obtain a search warrant when seeking cellular location data from service providers (State of
Washington Senate Judiciary Committee, 2012).
In terms of relevance and admissibility, the path has been a bit smoother but still has
some evolving nuances. Establishing the relevance of the records, or for data obtained via live
tracking or from the device itself, has proven fairly straightforward. As long as a connection
between the device and the person can be established, as when a phone is found in an
individual’s possession or registered in their name, the location of the phone can certainly be
germane. Furthermore, records from providers are admissible under the business records
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exception to the hearsay rule, so long as they were obtained appropriately (Blank, 2011). Some
argue that an expert witness should be required to testify to cellular records, since the average
juror is unlikely to understand the technology well enough to use the information to judge the
defendant fairly (Wells, 2014).
Others would argue that introducing historical cellular location data via an expert witness
would impart a weight to the information that may be unwarranted. The previous review of
existing research attributed a broad and variable range of accuracy to cellular location
information. Furthermore, Daniel (2014) asserts that such records do not meet the Daubert
standard for scientific evidence. The Daubert standard sets out specific criteria governing the
admissibility of expert findings. Daniel particularly highlights the requirement that processes be
subject to peer review, have published error rates, and conform to standard, repeatable
methodology. Daniel argues that location evidence from call detail records fails to meet any of
these conditions. Specific findings may not be repeated or corroborated via peer review, since it
is impossible to recreate all of the conditions at the time of the incident and it is likewise
infeasible to know the exact distance between phones and towers at any given time. To be
forensically sound, Daniel notes that a process must be predictable, repeatable, and verifiable.
Once again, he argues that the use of call detail records to track a phone’s location fails on all of
these counts.
This leaves the data recovered from the device themselves. Presumably, such data would
be easily admissible if law enforcement obtained a valid search warrant for the device, and if the
device was collected from the subject, the association between user and device would easily
cement the relevance of any recovered data. However, an interesting argument emerges, hinging
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on application permissions. As stated previously, Android applications require permissions to
access (and possibly cache or transmit) the device location, and users accept these permissions
upon installing the app. Thus, an inference can be made regarding the user’s consent to the
collection of their location data, which has been used to rebut their expectation of privacy with
regard to the information. However, vague privacy policies presented by apps assuring users that
the information is used “to improve services” or the like may obscure users’ awareness that their
location history may be collected or used by other parties. This may undermine the easy
assumption that cached location data should be accorded no special privacy protections (State of
Washington Senate Judiciary Committee, 2012).
In any case, privacy concerns continue to inform legal developments regarding mobile
device location data, but Michael and Clarke (2013) argue that even if proper legal measures are
indeed taken to obtain the data, it can still lead to a “miscarriage of justice” (p. 221) if the
tracking data is not accurate. Indeed, both Blank (2011) and Daniel (2014) argue that the data
can be helpful in refuting an alibi or demonstrate travel, for example. The issue arises from
overstating the accuracy of the presented information. Ultimately, though, as Wells (2014) points
out, the question of accuracy is for the jury to decide. The questions of reliability and authority
still restrict the utility of mobile device location data in criminal cases.

Emerging Issues
Aside from the trend of heightened legal protection of device location information,
additional challenges are emerging in the world of Android forensics, in general, and for location
data recovery, in particular. These complications start with the devices themselves. Newer
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versions of the Android operating system (KitKat and higher) have inherent security measures
that prevent access to key device functions, some of which were previously utilized by forensic
software developers and others to obtain full physical images of the phone’s internal memory.
Now that those exploits may no longer be used, examiners must rely on the built-in Android
backup functionality to extract data from the device. The main issue with this is that application
developers can set a flag in their app’s code to exclude their app’s content from the backup
process. Unsurprisingly, many stock Google applications appear to have this exclusion flag set.
The ultimate consequence of this development is that even with a fully accessible, unlocked
device, an examiner may still not be able to extract all of the phone’s data, including in some
cases, the data of particular interest. This leaves examiners with complex rooting or custom
recovery options that require significant research and testing, or they can opt for hardware-based
options like the Joint Test Action Group (JTAG), In-System Programming (ISP), or chip-off
methods that are time-consuming or potentially destructive, if they need to retrieve excluded or
deleted data from a particular device (International Association of Computer Investigative
Specialists, 2015).
Given that Google excludes many of its apps from the backup process, this begs the
question of what other backup resources are available to users. Here we turn to the cloud.
Google, of course, backs up contacts and emails associated with users’ Gmail accounts. Other
providers like Facebook may keep messages or contacts on their servers, as well. Recovery of
this data is a significant challenge, introducing a host of technical and legal issues. For example,
the data may be stored across multiple servers that are geographically scattered. This complicates
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jurisdictional issues and prevents the traditional approach of capturing a raw image of data, since
the data must be identified and isolated before the extraction process (CelleBrite, 2015).
One prominent cell phone forensics company, CelleBrite, has developed a new tool
called Cloud Analyzer, specifically designed to retrieve data from these remote resources. The
tool utilizes the various providers’ own APIs to authenticate credentials and download content.
Credentials may be manually entered, as in cases where owner consent has been obtained, or
they may be recovered from account information extracted from a target device. In any case, this
technique offers two inherent benefits. First, the use of the providers’ own interfaces and
protocols means that whatever the provider would allow the user to access, the Cloud Analyzer
software can also retrieve. Second, because this method also employs the user credentials,
concerns over encryption and specificity are rendered moot. The data will be received in its
decrypted state and only the authorized user data will be obtained (CelleBrite, 2015).
The latest development involves out-of-the-box encryption for new Android devices,
running version 6.0, also known as Marshmallow. Google has mandated full-disk encryption be
implemented by the time the user completes their device setup steps, though only for new
Marshmallow devices that meet certain performance standards. The requirement will not extend
to older devices upgrading to Marshmallow, but the concern from a data recovery standpoint is
that this will introduce significant complications going forward and may result in an inability to
extract any data from the devices, even via hardware-based methods that would normally extract
the full device content (Cunningham, 2015). This development could place even more emphasis
on cloud data.
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In summary, a heightened emphasis on securing device application functionality and user
data has developed, raising new obstacles to software-based methods of capturing a complete
extraction from newer Android devices. The simultaneously emerging shift from device-based
storage of user data to cloud storage further complicates mobile device data recovery. This could
place more emphasis on thorough analysis and understanding of what data is recovered from the
device, as well as the cloud provider data. In any case, the recovery of any location data obtained
from either source could prove crucial in a criminal case, and the ability to assess the accuracy of
such data could figure heavily into its admissibility and impact.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
This study focuses on Android devices, since Android currently comprises the largest
market share among mobile devices. Four different test phones were obtained, each a different
make and model. The table below summarizes the features of each device, highlighting the
differences in system version, network type, and hardware capabilities. These distinction mirror
the wide variety of devices likely to be encountered in forensic casework.
Table 4 - Test Device Information
LG VS870
Lucid II
4.1.2
Android OS
JellyBean
Version
(Unrooted)
(Status)
Verizon
Carrier
CDMA
Network Type
GNSS Sensor(s) GPS
Make/Model

Samsung SGH-i257
Galaxy S4 Mini
4.4.2
KitKat
(Unrooted)
AT&T
GSM
GPS
GLONASS

OnePlus One
A0001
5.0
Lollipop
(Unrooted)
AT&T
GSM
GPS GLONASS

Samsung SMG900P Galaxy S5
5.0
Lollipop
(Unrooted)
Boost Mobile
CDMA
GPS
GLONASS

The decision not to root the devices was made for a number of reasons. First, a rooted
device is the best-case scenario in terms of data recovery capabilities, but the goal of this study is
to address the most typical scenario forensic examiners are likely to encounter. Since rooting is a
complex and potentially damaging process, it seems likely that most users would not attempt to
root their device. Thus, a rooted device would probably be an exception rather than the rule in
forensic casework situations.
The devices were then prepped for the testing phase, with various location-aware
applications installed and user accounts configured. These apps were specifically selected for
their location functionalities, including permissions. Several application categories were chosen
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for testing, including navigation/mapping, messaging/chat, fitness, weather, location sharing, and
leisure activity apps. Ad-supported games were also installed, to see if any location data would
be cached in relation to advertisements transmitted to the device based on its location. Devices
and applications were configured with a view to optimizing the recovery of cached location data
from the device.
Devices were used in 24 test sessions under controlled conditions. Recorded test
parameters ranged from actual time and location to environment (rural, urban, or suburban) to
enabled sensors (GNSS, WLAN, cellular, or combination), as well as careful documentation of
user activity. Weather conditions were also noted, as well as which devices were used, of course.
User activity involved navigation sessions, photo/video captures, chat and location sharing
sessions, weather lookup, location searches, web searches, and/or workout recordings. The
documentation was maintained to allow for a later evaluation of reliability regarding any
extracted data.
After completing the device testing phase, work shifted to recovery of device data. At this
point, issues with accessibility due to security implementations of later Android devices were
encountered and documented. Successful extractions of each the devices were performed. One test
device was subjected to an initial extraction, then a reset operation was performed. Following the
hard reset, the device data was acquired again to determine if any location artifacts would be
recoverable after the reset operation. All extracted data was then analyzed for location artifacts
using various tools.
The analysis strategy began by identifying which apps had permissions to the device
location. Permissions information is stored in the file title “packages.xml.” Some software utilities,
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such as CelleBrite Physical Analyzer, will parse the permissions information from this file and
report it in its list of installed apps. Once the apps with location permissions were identified, the
associated application data for each was examined for location information. The examination
followed much of the previously outlined strategy, focusing first on SQLite databases and geotagged media files. Further analysis involved a search for possible textual location information,
including addresses, destinations, points of interest, MAC addresses, etc. This latter step was
effected via keyword searches and manual review of application data.
In addition, the Google Location History was retrieved for each test device using the
specialized Cloud Analyzer software. These operations were performed using both the credentials
obtained from the devices themselves, as well as a manual entry of the credentials, to see if the
method used had any effect on the results. A third step involved the collection of one day’s worth
of location history for one test device via the Google user account interface itself, accessible by
logging into the account on the web. This data was retrieved to compare the collected cloud
location history to the location data made available by Google to its users.
All recovered location information was compared to the location data recovered from the
devices themselves, as well as the known locations recorded in the test session documentation.
This was done with a view to confirming the accuracy trends noted in the previous research,
ranging from highly accurate GNSS data to the variable reliability of cellular network location
information. The data was also examined for trends involving environmental impact, in terms of
indoor versus outdoor activity and area type (rural, suburban, or urban).
From there, reviews of system logs, application code, databases, and text-based application
data (XML files) were undertaken to see if any determinations about sensor activity could be made.
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For example, if a location artifact was found in the web browser cache and timestamped with a
particular value, it would be useful to be able to establish if the GNSS sensor was active at this
time. If sensor activity could be ascertained for that timeframe, it could help bolster the reliability
of the location artifact.
Another consideration was whether the mere presence or absence of certain information
could be used to infer which sensors were active. For example, do certain applications only
function or log data when the GNSS sensors are in use? Or do they still cache information but with
null values for certain metadata like accuracy and altitude values? Will devices still geo-tag photos
and videos if the GNSS services are not enabled? If an obvious trend could be observed in regards
to these questions, it may have implications for the future accuracy evaluation of certain types of
location data recovered from devices.
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS
Extraction Issues
Three of the devices were susceptible to physical extraction methods. One device, the
OnePlus One A0001, running Android 5.0 (Lollipop), blocked the physical extraction since the
device is running Lollipop and is not rooted. Furthermore, because of additional technical
aspects of this device, all solutions for obtaining root access would require wiping the user data
first. Thus, this device could only be analyzed logically via the ADB (Android Debugging
Bridge) backup method.
The other Lollipop device, the Galaxy S5, did have a physical extraction solution that
does not involve wiping the user data, but to test the impact of resetting a device to allow root
access, the ADB backup method was used on this device first. Then, the device was used once to
take three photos, reset, and a physical extraction was successfully performed. The resulting
physical extraction was examined to determine if information previously recovered via the ADB
backup could still be located after the reset operation. For instance, keyword searches were
performed for known latitude and longitude values recovered via the analysis of the ADB
backup. These searches were unsuccessful, though the data was known to be cached in SQLite
databases.
Additional research into this apparent complication revealed that the SQLite databases in
question store the latitude and longitude coordinates as “REAL” or “DOUBLE” (floating point)
or “INTEGER” values. Therefore, a search for numeric strings consistent with coordinate values
will not recover these artifacts, even if regular expressions or GREP techniques are used. A

37

potential solution involved attempts to carve out SQLite databases containing text terms like “lat
REAL” and “latitude DOUBLE,” or similar variations. These search terms successfully returned
hits on the actual databases containing the location artifacts, but no results of value were
obtained when searching the unallocated space of the post-reset physical extraction. Searches of
SQLite databases carved from the unallocated space were also negative.
Clearly, recovery of location data stored in SQLite databases after resetting a device
presents significant challenges. This underscores the need to mitigate risk when confronted with
devices that are not inherently supported for software-based physical extraction. In some cases,
where encryption is not involved, hardware-based techniques may be a better solution. Though
they may require more time and expense, they can assure access to all of the device content
without running the risk of resetting the device.
Furthermore, as anticipated, certain applications were excluded from the ADB backup in
the Lollipop device extractions. Notably, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, Chrome browser,
and Google Maps application data was excluded from the backups of these devices. On a
positive note, these items were listed as installed applications by the forensic tools. A review of
the “localappstate.db” database confirms that the apps were installed on the devices, as well as
their installation time. In a case where Facebook Messenger or Google location data was needed,
but the extraction failed to retrieve it, the investigator may wish to turn to the next resource
discussed: the cloud.
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Cloud Data Recovery
The first notable feature of the Cloud Analyzer software’s “Google Location History”
extraction function is the 30-day range limit on location data. Presumably, this is a result of
Google’s own imposed limitations capping the retrieval of history information even by users and
devices to one month at a time. By repeating the extraction process and selecting different
ranges, though, multiple months’ worth of locations were recovered for each test device. The
figure below shows the Cloud Analyzer interface with the 30-day range selection requirement.

Figure 3 - Cloud Analyzer Location History Options (30-day range)
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Two methods exist for retrieving Google Location History. Both were tested and
successfully used. The first method involves the export of a specialized account package from
the CelleBrite Physical Analyzer (P.A.) software. This account package contains all of the user
account credentials parsed by the P. A. software, as well as the unique Android device identifier.
By utilizing this information, the software is essentially able to present the request for the
location history via Google’s own API as though the device itself were retrieving the data. This
offers a key advantage over the second method, in which examiners manually enter the account
credentials. Manual entry generates a notification email from the provider, Google, to the
accountholder regarding a new login from an unrecognized device. Use of the account package
(device credentials) does not produce this alert to the user. This distinction was confirmed in the
tests performed for this study. A notification email was received when the manual credential
entry method was used but not with the account package method. Note that account packages
could not be created for the Lollipop ADB backup extractions, as the Google account credentials
are not recovered via this extraction method. For such situations, account credentials would have
to be obtained via the device owner or other source and entered manually.
Both methods yielded the same results, and the results were very impressive. Latitude
and longitude coordinates for the device locations were retrieved with a frequency of roughly
one location per minute that the devices were up and running. Another initial observation was
that the retrieved coordinates were in decimal format, and the precision of all recovered
coordinates appeared to be limited to the thousandths place. This could have implications
regarding the accuracy of the cloud location data. However, the frequency with which the device
reports its location to Google was surprising, and certainly supports the idea that Google does
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indeed have a vast cache of user location history information that could potentially be of great
value in criminal investigations. Table 5 illustrates the frequency with which Google location
updates are recorded for the device, based on a sampling of test results. The results displayed
were selected to optimize for visualization of any trends noted among the different environment
types and sensor activity, so some sessions with identical environment and sensor parameters
were excluded from the table though they displayed similar trends.
Table 5 - Average Cloud Location Frequency
Device

Number of
Cloud
Locations

Up Time
(minutes)

OnePlus One
LG VS870
OnePlus One
VS870
OnePlus One
S4 Mini
Galaxy S5
LG VS870
OnePlus One
LG VS870
OnePlus One
LG VS870
OnePlus One
LG VS870
OnePlus One

22
118
116
84
115
85
86
56
63
51
110
43
39
78
118

25
105
105
105
110
80
82
71
74
50
115
49
34
80
121

S4 Mini

23

19

LG VS870

27

26

Galaxy S5

0

10

OnePlus One

0

60

Average
Environment
Frequency
(Sensors Active)
(points/minute)
Suburban, Indoor
0.88
(Cell, WLAN, GNSS)
1.12
Suburban, Outdoor
1.10
(Cell, WLAN, GNSS)
0.80
Suburban, Outdoor
1.05
(Cell only)
1.06
Urban, Outdoor
1.05
(Cell, WLAN, GNSS)
0.79
Suburban, Indoor
0.85
(Cell only)
1.02
Rural, Indoor
0.96
(Cell, WLAN, GNSS)
0.88
Rural, Outdoor
1.15
(Cell, WLAN, GNSS)
0.98
Suburban, Indoor
0.98
(Cell, WLAN)
Suburban, Outdoor
1.21
(Cell, GNSS)
Rural, Outdoor
1.04
(Cell only)
Suburban, Indoor
0
(WLAN only)
Suburban, Outdoor
0
(WLAN, GNSS)
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Some notable observations from this data include the fact that the trend of roughly one
location per minute seems to persist across environment types and regardless of which services
are active, with one notable exception: when test devices were used with cellular services
disabled, no cloud locations were captured. Interestingly, a fitness app also used in one such test
session did cache some location data for the same timeframe. However, the phenomenon could
be an aberration, given that it involved just two devices in as many test sessions. More testing
would be needed to confirm if this trend holds.

Recovery of Device Location Data
Some location information was automatically parsed by the forensic software tools used
to analyze the data from the test devices. This included Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp, and
Viber chat message locations, some Google Maps and Waze navigation data, and geo-tagged
media files. These artifacts are essentially the “low-hanging fruit,” as it were, so not much
additional strategy is required to identify them. However, other data of possible value poses
greater challenges.
App and File Review
A review of the extracted data confirmed that the location cache files identified in
previous studies, “cache.cell” and “cache.wifi,” were not recovered from any of the test devices,
as expected based on the ages of the test devices. The file review then shifted to the next most
obvious targets: geo-tagged photos and SQLite databases. In terms of geo-tagged photos,
although they were identified by the analysis software immediately, the results were somewhat
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muddled. For example, one might expect a trend in which geo-tagged photos would only be
recovered from instances when the GNSS services were active. However, in some instances
where GNSS services were noted as enabled and photos were captured, no geo-tagged photos
were recovered. Two of the test devices, the Galaxy S5 and the Galaxy S4 Mini, recorded no
geo-tagged photos, even though they were configured to do so and used to capture images.
Furthermore, in two sessions on two separate devices, geo-tagged photos were recovered despite
the fact that no GNSS services were enabled at the time of the session. Thus, an empirical basis
for inferring sensor status from the mere presence or absence of geo-tag metadata in recovered
images could not be determined.
Contributing further to the ambiguity, there was also no discernable pattern regarding the
geo-tagged images captured at times when test session notes indicate the GNSS services were
disabled. For example, in one instance, the test phone was indoors with cellular service only
enabled, and the error was within roughly 130 meters from actual location. In another instance,
however, the same phone was indoors with cellular and WLAN enabled, and the error was
around 30 meters. A second test phone used in the same area as the first in the same outdoor,
cellular-only test session appears to have geo-tagged the photo with a location over a kilometer
away from the actual site of the photo.
The camera apps for all devices were configured during device setup to geo-tag photos,
so a settings issue in the camera should not be responsible for the absence of geo-tagged photos
from sessions in which the GNSS services were enabled. Weather conditions during such
sessions were noted as being partly cloudy or clear. One possibly notable factor could be that
other location-sensitive applications were also used in the sessions in which geo-tagged images
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were captured in spite of the disabled GNSS services. Such applications, like Life360, a locationsharing app, could have permissions to change the WLAN connection state, for example. This
could potentially activate another resource for devices to obtain their location, though it is
unknown if such a phenomenon resulted in the results observed here.
Identifying Location-Permitted Apps
Having revisited the topic of permissions, the focus now shifts to apps with access to the
device location. By examining the file titled “packages.xml,” various apps were identified which
have access to either coarse or fine location, or more often both. The “packages.xml” file is a
simple XML text file in which details about the installed applications are stored, including the
app permissions. The permissions appear as a list and are organized by app. The figure below
provides a snapshot of the permissions list for the RunKeeper fitness app. Note that this
particular app only has access to the device “FINE” location. Based on the previous discussion
regarding the maximum accuracies of both “COARSE” and “FINE” location permissions, this
could indicate that the RunKeeper app data, if recovered, is likely to be quite accurate.
This idea is corroborated by observations made during test sessions regarding the
RunKeeper app, as well as several other apps. Both the RunKeeper and MapMyWalk apps, for
example, were noted to display a distance of “0.0” upon conclusion of workouts in which GNSS
sensors were not enabled. A review of the associated databases for these apps confirms that no
location data was cached for those particular sessions, just start and end times. In addition, the
Waze navigation app insisted on “High Accuracy” mode being enabled by the user (including
GNSS sensors) before performing navigation functions. Intuitively, this makes sense for the
apps’ various functions, as navigation instructions would not be helpful if they were not finely
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attuned to the device’s actual location, and fitness apps aim to provide users a track of their
workout waypoints to facilitate measurements of improvement over successive workouts. For
this reason, an investigator may wish to test a particular application of possible interest on a
control device for evidence of this type of app-specific settings requirement. Doing so may allow
an examiner to gain some insight into the reliability of similar data recovered from the evidence
item.

Figure 4 - RunKeeper Permissions from “Packages.xml” with “ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION”

Returning to the topic of permissions, a couple of other comments on the “packages.xml”
file are warranted. First, the Physical Analyzer software does parse out a list of installed
applications, including a summary of their permissions. However, it does not go into detail about
coarse versus fine locations and so on. A quick “Find” search of the “packages.xml” file in
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Internet Explorer for the terms “ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION” and
“ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION” will enable an investigator to identify each app that could
potentially store location information based on its permissions. The app name and path appear
above the list of its associated permissions, as shown in Figure 4. It is also important to note that
the “packages.xml” file appears to have been excluded from the Android backup for the Lollipop
test devices.
Given that the apps used in the test sessions were specifically chosen because of their
location permissions, the focus of this study shifted quickly to reviewing the SQLite databases
associated with each app. In general, the examination of app databases quickly made clear that
location-sharing and fitness apps seem to cache the most data, frequently with high update rates
and accuracy. They also seem most likely to cache other location metadata, like accuracy and
altitude. Navigation and mapping apps seemed to do less logging of actual track points, focusing
more on search results and recent destinations, but Waze did have a database named “tts.db” that
contains timestamped turn-by-turn directions. These could certainly play a key role in
reconstructing an individual’s activity, though not necessarily with the minutiae of a true
tracking device.
Many databases were found to store location-related content. The trick was in
determining the nature of the cached information. Was it consistent with the device’s actual
location as noted in the test session documentation? Or was it based more on searched locations
or destinations? What metadata was cached within the databases? Table 6 below details twentysix of the recovered databases of possible interest by filename, along with a brief description of
their content. The databases are presented with their associated app, with the apps divided into
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seven distinct categories. A detailed description of SQLite database analysis follows,
highlighting specific databases of interest that were recovered from the test devices.
Table 6 - Databases of Interest
App
Category

Navigation/
Mapping

Database Name

Source App

Content

gmm_storage.db

Google Maps

suggestions.db

Google Earth

tts.db

Waze

user.db

Waze

mytracks.db

MyTracks

RunKeeper.sqlite

RunKeeper

workout.db

Map My
Walk

360LocationDB

Life360,
FriendLocator

messaging.db
nc.db

Life360,
FriendLocator
Life360

dumpLogsDatabase

FriendLocator

searched locations,
directions. Stored in BLOB
data. Manual review or
strings/keyword searches
required.
searched locations
(addresses or points of
interest), with timestamps
turn-by-turn directions
(transcript), with
timestamps
recent locations with
lat/long and timestamps
Workout session history,
timestamped trackpoints,
with metadata (accuracy,
etc.
Workout session history,
timestamped trackpoints,
with metadata (accuracy,
etc.)
Workout session history,
timestamped trackpoints,
with metadata (accuracy,
etc.)
Location history with
timestamps and metadata
(accuracy, altitude, etc.)
Chat messages with lat/long
and timestamps
Notifications with extra text
metadata (timestamps and
lat/long)
Detailed activity log, with
connections, request details,
and locations info,
timestamps (lengthy text
format, manual recovery or
keyword searches needed)

Fitness

Location
Sharing
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App
Category
Location
Sharing

Chat

Database Name

Source App

Content

fsq.db

Swarm

threads_db2

Facebook
Messenger

viber_messages

Viber

msgstore.db

WhatsApp

naver_line

LINE

scout.db

FieldTrip

oneweather.db

OneWeather

weather.db

GO Weather

forecast_accu.db

Accuweather

ContextLog_0.db

Pre-installed
Samsung
app/feature

event

Pre-installed
Amazon
shopping app
Google
Mobile
Services
web browser

Recent locations with
lat/long and timestamps
chat messages with user
location (lat/long) and
timestamps
chat messages with user
location (lat/long) and
timestamps
chat messages with user
location (lat/long) and
timestamps
chat messages with user
location (lat/long) and
timestamps
Locations of viewed points
of interest with view
timestamp
saved locations, including
lat/long, timestamps of last
hit
Recent locations, including
lat/long and timestamp
saved location to display in
widget (not necessarily
current location)
Tracks app
launches/sessions with
timestamps and duration of
activity
WLAN/cellular data usage
stats with timestamp

Leisure

Weather

herrevad
Other
https_www.google.com_0.localstorage
NetworkUsage.db

Google
Mobile
Services
Android
Location
Tracker

locdatabase
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WLAN network history
with BSSID (MAC address)
and timestamps
searched terms, lat/long,
with timestamps
some WLAN/cellular data
usage stats with timestamp
logs with lat/long and
timestamps

SQLite Database Analysis – Fitness App Example
SQLite databases store content in tables, which in turn contain records associated with
particular rows and columns. Often, content of interest is stored in multiple tables or in a format
that is less intuitive to the human reader, such as timestamps stored in UNIX milliseconds format
rather than the typical month/day/year, hour/minute/seconds format we are used to seeing. Many
utilities exist for viewing and extracting data from these files. In this case, SQLite Studio was
used to extract information of interest from the recovered databases. Custom queries were
created to retrieve the relevant location content. To illustrate the method used, the following
figures depict an example database, the RunKeeper app’s “RunKeeper.sqlite” database, as well
as the query and its results. Query results were output into Excel spreadsheets to facilitate further
data review, comparison, filtering, and the like.

Figure 5 - RunKeeper.sqlite database, trips table
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Figure 6 - RunKeeper.sqlite database, points table

Figure 7 - RunKeeper.sqlite database, query converting timestamps and combining content from
trips and points tables
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Figure 8 - RunKeeper.sqlite database, query results
This database offers a few noteworthy observations. First, the precision of the latitude
and longitude values extends well beyond the cloud data’s thousandths-place level, all the way to
eight places after the decimal, or to one hundred-millionths place. In addition, the timestamps are
also incredibly precise, stored in UNIX epoch milliseconds format. This is typical of many
Android applications and was noted in the majority of the examined databases. Furthermore, the
update intervals, as noted in the “time_interval_at_point” column, are quite frequent, occurring
multiple times per minute. This was also noted to be a common trait among databases associated
with the other tested fitness apps, MyTracks and MapMyWalk. The other two fitness apps also
exhibited the same behavior in test sessions, failing to report a distance or cache workout
waypoints when the GNSS service was not active. If these observations are any indication,
recovered fitness app data is likely to be quite precise to the actual device location, quite accurate
due to GNSS sensor use requirement, and frequently updated, making it a potentially valuable
resource in an investigation in which it is available.
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Chat and Location-Sharing Apps
The chat and location-sharing apps also seemed to cache the actual device location with
significant precision. However, the chat apps seem more likely to be parsed by the commercial
forensic software tools, such as Internet Evidence Finder and CelleBrite Physical Analyzer. The
following tables display examples of the content obtained from the various chat applications
which cached location data, as recovered by the commercial software tools used in this study.
Table 7 - Selection of content recovered from Viber app's "viber_messages" database as reported
by Internet Evidence Finder
Sender

TestPhone
Gsmone
-Not Found-Not FoundTestPhone
Gsmone
-Not FoundTestPhone
Gsmone
TestPhone
Gsmone
-Not Found-

Recipient(s)

, TestPhone
Gsmone
, TestPhone
Gsmone

, TestPhone
Gsmone

, TestPhone
Gsmone

Message Sent
Date/Time (UTC)
(MM/dd/yyyy)
09/16/2015
01:55:16 PM
09/16/2015
01:55:35 PM
09/16/2015
01:56:18 PM
09/16/2015
01:56:28 PM
09/16/2015
01:57:04 PM
09/16/2015
01:57:11 PM
09/16/2015
01:57:20 PM
09/16/2015
01:57:25 PM

Message

Message
Status

Latitude

Longitude

Orlando today!

Received

27.8014691

-82.3025061

Sho nuff!

27.8014233

-82.3024485

No location
now?
We'll see

Sent /
Delivered
Sent /
Delivered
Received

n/a

n/a

27.8014691

-82.3025061

How bout now?
I re-enabled it
Cool

Sent /
Delivered
Received

27.8014181

-82.3024472

27.8014691

-82.3025061

Mine is always
enabled
Nice

Received

27.8014691

-82.3025061

Sent /
Delivered

27.8014181

-82.3024472
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Table 8 - Selection of content recovered from Facebook Messenger app's "threads_db2" database
as reported by CelleBrite Physical Analyzer
From

Body

Location

100009025428140
Testphone Gsm

1 - This message sent from A0001 to
VS870 at 4211 N. Lois Ave. Tampa.
Active services- cellular, WiFi, and gnss
2 - This message sent from A0001 to
VS870 at 4211 N. Lois Ave. Tampa.
Active services- cellular, WiFi, and gnss
3 - This message sent from A0001 to
VS870 at 4211 N. Lois Ave. Tampa.
Active services- cellular, WiFi, and gnss

(27.977825,
-82.513403)

100009025428140
Testphone Gsm
100009025428140
Testphone Gsm

Timestamp:
Date
5/27/2015

(27.977825,
-82.513403)

5/27/2015

(27.977825,
-82.513403)

5/27/2015

Timestamp:
Time
5/27/2015
10:04:33
PM(UTC+0)
5/27/2015
10:05:22
PM(UTC+0)
5/27/2015
10:06:08
PM(UTC+0)

As illustrated in the tables, the cached latitude and longitude values are quite precise,
with Viber recording up to the ten-millionths place and Facebook Messenger up to the
millionths. However, although these location coordinates are quite precise, they are only cached
when a message is sent. Locations can also be recovered for the remote conversation partner, not
just the local device from which the data was retrieved, as seen as in the Viber messages above.
No location data was recovered for messages sent during test sessions when the GNSS services
were disabled, interestingly. Also, no locations were stored by the other two chat apps tested,
WhatsApp and LINE, even though the apps were configured to share locations with chat
conversation partners.
In general, the location-sharing apps also report the device’s current location, and they do
so with great precision. Although no SQLite databases containing location data were recovered
for the Glympse app, several source databases were identified for the other applications. Life360
and Locate My Friends are apps from the same developer, generating databases with the same
names, just under different directory paths. Swarm is associated with Foursquare, so its primary
database is named and formatted similarly, as well. One interesting finding from the review of
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these databases is that the precision of the cached coordinates seemed to vary, with coordinates
associated with messages sent via the apps’ interfaces reported with an even greater number of
values after the decimal point. It’s also important to note that the coordinates appeared rounded
to the nearest degree when viewed within the CelleBrite Physical Analyzer’s internal SQLite
database view. The following figures show the precision with which the Locate My Friends app
(and its sister application, Life360) records latitude and longitude values, as viewed from within
the Physical Analyzer and SQLite Studio interfaces, for messages and cached locations.

Figure 9 - Contents of the Locate My Friends app's "messaging.db" database as viewed within
Physical Analyzer (coordinates rounded to nearest degree)

Figure 10 - Contents of the Locate My Friends app's "messaging.db" database as viewed within
SQLite Studio (more precise coordinates)
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Figure 11 - Contents of the Locate My Friends app's "360LocationDB" database, SQLite query
results. High precision coordinates noted, but less precise than those associated with messages
found in "messaging.db."
These figures demonstrate the higher precision ascribed to coordinates associated with
the app’s chat messages, as recorded in the “messages.db” database, versus the cached locations
stored in the “360Location” database. The message coordinates may even be too precise to be
genuine, based on the previous discussion of coordinate precision levels in consumer-grade
devices. In addition, the timestamps reflect fairly frequent update intervals of roughly fifteen
minutes for the stored location points, while the chat message coordinates are dependent on the
sending of messages. It is also notable that the “provider” is noted as “fused” in the
“360LocationDB” database, indicating that the Google location services’ Fused Location
Provider API is used by this application.
Other findings from the analysis of the location sharing apps’ databases included the
obliteration of older records. Test session documentation shows these apps were used in multiple
sessions prior to the earliest records recovered from the extracted databases. This was consistent
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among the Locate My Friends, Life360, and Swarm apps, across all devices. Also, each of the
aforementioned apps cached locations for sessions in which the GNSS services were noted as
disabled in the test session documentation. In short, these apps cached very precise data, with
moderate or conditional update intervals, appear not to store locations indefinitely, and will store
coordinates even when GNSS sensors are not enabled by the user.
Leisure and Navigation Apps
Alternatively, the leisure apps tested seemed more likely to record searched destinations,
rather than the actual device location. As an example, the Foursquare app caches recently viewed
venues but does not specify the location of the device at the time the search was executed.
Empirical use of these applications suggests that the viewed venues will generally be nearby
points of interest, as related to the device location at the time of the search. However, in a
retroactive analysis situation, this would be an inference and is not documented directly in the
app’s databases. It could be corroborated with other sources, however, such as Google Location
History or carrier cell tower location records. The table below displays the content retrieved from
the Foursquare app’s “fsq.db” database, as recovered from the OnePlus One A0001 test device.
Table 9 - Content of Foursquare's "fsq.db" database, extracted via SQLite query
last_viewed
1442418216

Converted
Time (UTC)
9/16/2015 15:43

1442606556

9/18/2015 20:02

1442606575

9/18/2015 20:02

1442606589

9/18/2015 20:03

name

loc_lat

loc_long

loc_address

loc_city

East Coast
Pizza
Starbucks

27.79071808

-82.34282684

Riverview

27.98117065

-82.48847961

Brio Tuscan
Grille
Cigar City
Brewing

27.9652195

-82.52071381

27.95913696

-82.50926971

13340 Lincoln
Rd
2720 W Dr
Martin Luther
King Jr Blvd
2223 N West
Shore Blvd
3924 W Spruce
St

56

Tampa

Tampa
Tampa

Other leisure apps stored location content in text-based XML files, as did the Field Trip
app. Two files titled “lastLocation.xml” and “lastNotification.xml” were recovered from the
Field Trip app’s directory. These files contained precise latitude and longitude values with
timestamps but they were stored only for the most recent activity. The cached coordinates appear
to relate to the actual device location and were consistent with the actual test session location,
within 100 meters. Another noteworthy finding is that these coordinates were cached at times
when the GNSS services were disabled on the test device, the LG VS870, in this case.

Figure 12 - Content of the Field Trip app's "lastLocation.xml" file
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Figure 13 - Content of the Field Trip app's "lastNotification.xml" file
Falling somewhere in between the fitness and leisure apps, the navigation apps store both
searched locations and in some instances, the actual device location at the time of the search.
Two databases among the Waze navigation app data demonstrate this dichotomy. The “user.db”
database contains destinations to which the user has navigated via the Waze app. The “tts.db”
offers a rather less conventional twist on pinpointing the device location, by transcribing the
turn-by-turn directions with timestamps. Extracted content from both databases is displayed in
the tables below to illustrate the different storage strategies, highlighting data for the same
navigation session from each database.
Table 10- Destination data extracted from the Waze app's "user.db" database, RECENTS and
PLACES tables, using SQLite query
name

city

state

longitude

latitude

The
Proper Pie
Company

Davenport

FL

-81.638595

28.214551 1442438167
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created_time

Converted Created
Time (UTC)
9/16/2015 21:16:07

Table 11 - Turn-by-turn directions recovered from Waze app's "tts.db" database, using SQLite
query
text

path

145 Ridge Center Drive

database//Jane//1442438170-504860238.tts
database//Jane//1442438170-504890239.tts
database//Jane//1442438170-504890240.tts
database//Jane//1442438170-517373241.tts
database//Jane//1442438170-517373242.tts
database//Jane//1442438170-517404243.tts
database//Jane//1442438170-517404244.tts
database//Jane//1442438170-529093245.tts
database//Jane//1442438170-529093246.tts
database//Jane//1442438170-529124247.tts
database//Jane//1442438170-529124248.tts
database//Jane//1442438170-531260249.tts

The Proper Pie Company
Let's take SR-417 S, and I-4 W
exit to Exit 3: Osceola Pkwy (toll)
exit right to Exit 3: Osceola Pkwy (toll)
stay to the right to Osceola Pkwy
stay to the left to I-4 W / Tampa
turn left on Citrus Ridge Dr
turn left on Majesty Dr
then turn left
then turn left on Majesty Dr
you'll arrive at The Proper Pie Company

Converted
Time (UTC)
9/16/2015
21:16:11
9/16/2015
21:16:11
9/16/2015
21:16:11
9/16/2015
21:16:11
9/16/2015
21:16:11
9/16/2015
21:16:11
9/16/2015
21:16:11
9/16/2015
21:16:11
9/16/2015
21:16:11
9/16/2015
21:16:11
9/16/2015
21:16:11
9/16/2015
21:16:11

Clearly, there is some ambiguity regarding the timestamps of the turn-by-turn directions,
with multiple instructions timestamped identically. However, they do show evidence of a
navigation route request, which may be indicative of travel or intent to travel by the user.
Digging a little deeper, we see that Waze is actually caching the original location and timestamp
of the search in a separate text file, titled “waze_log.txt.” This file actually does contain the
device’s precise latitude and longitude value at the time the navigation request was initiated, as
well as the coordinates of the destination. Figure 14 shows the relevant excerpt from this log file,
with the timestamp (blue), origin coordinates (yellow), and destination coordinates (green)
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highlighted. The recorded data is consistent with test session activity, and since this app’s
navigation function requires the GNSS service, the cached location is quite accurate.
[17:16:07.696 Warning] First routing id: 1442438168 [navigate_route_trans.c:381
(navigate_route_init_context)]
[17:16:07.696 Warning]
UID,842961612,ChBWNTBHNnNYa2xZN2hvd3RBEJK3568FGAwiA3VzYSjMpfqRAw,203
At,-81.301666,28.370980,-0.000006,257,3,53135374,53135286
RoutingRequest,1442438168,3,-10,1,-1,1000,-81301679,28371032,-1,53135374,53135286,SR-417
S,F,-81638595,28214551,-1,-1,-1,Ridge Center
Drive,T,T,T,26,1,F,2,T,3,F,4,T,5,F,6,T,7,T,8,T,10,F,12,F,13,F,16,T,32,T,0,145,Davenport,FL,62167,0,
F,-1,4,257,-1,-1,-1,-1,81301679,28371032,257,F,2,twitter,0,facebook,0,0,googlePlaces.ChIJNUVHYI5w3YgRUB2XohCuq
bE,,, [RealtimeNet.c:3902 (RTNet_RequestRoute)]

Figure 14 - Navigation request from Waze app's "waze_log.txt" text file

Browser, Weather Apps, and Games
In addition, some less intuitive sources of location data include files associated with the
web browser, weather apps, and ad-supported games. The web browser stores “localstorage”
databases containing website-specific content cached for later visits, named with the website
URL with the “.localstorage” extension. Other apps can store these databases within their own
directories, as well, but the web browser’s collection are discussed here. The browser’s
“localstorage” databases are specific to the particular website visited and can contain probative
user-generated information. In the case of the www.google.com website’s “localstorage”
database, this can include search terms and location data, as shown in the figure below.

60

Figure 15 - Content of web browser's "https_www.google.com_0.localstorage" database,
showing search terms, location coordinates, and timestamps
The content is stored as BLOB data, and its organization makes the recovery of the data a
bit cumbersome, but the data recovered from this database was consistent with the test session
activity. This database was only recovered for the two non-Lollipop devices for which physical
extraction without root privileges was supported, but in both instances, the cached coordinates
had timestamps associated with test sessions in which the GNSS services were enabled, and their
precision was at least millionths-place level. The data is only recorded when a user actually
conducts a search via Google.
Weather apps also appeared to cache some locations, although there may be some
ambiguity regarding whether they were the actual device location or just a user-requested
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location. The OneWeather app did have one database that cached apparent device locations, but
the precision was fairly low, only one hundredths-place level. Alternatively, the AccuWeather’s
“forecast_accu.db” database stores more precise coordinates, but they may not be associated with
the device’s actual location. Fortunately, in this case, the database actually flags whether or not
the stored information is the device’s actual current location. The following tables display the
varying types of location information recovered from the tested weather apps.
Table 12 - OneWeather app's "oneweather.db" cached locations, from geocodes table, showing
device location history
city

state country

lat

lng

Riverview
Tampa
Tampa
Tampa
Tampa
Durham
Hamptonville
Hamptonville
Goldsboro
New Bern
Tampa
Wesley
Chapel
Wimauma
Tampa

FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
FL
FL

US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US

27.8
28.13
27.98
28.11
27.98
35.94
36.07
36.05
35.34
35.14
28.14
28.19

-82.3
-82.38
-82.51
-82.37
-82.52
-78.92
-80.81
-80.79
-77.9
-76.97
-82.33
-82.35

FL
FL

US
US

27.76 -82.26
27.95 -82.46

lastHit
Converted Timestamp
(UTC)
9/16/2015 15:11:24
6/6/2015 23:17:10
6/9/2015 17:26:24
6/9/2015 23:24:27
6/10/2015 13:57:22
7/14/2015 15:41:23
7/15/2015 11:58:59
7/15/2015 15:01:54
7/17/2015 14:46:33
7/17/2015 15:52:07
9/5/2015 14:04:15
9/5/2015 15:09:51

hits

9/19/2015 14:18:41
9/19/2015 23:40:47

1
1

4
1
1
1
1
3
3
1
1
1
1
1

Table 13 - AccuWeather app's "accu_forecast.db" database content showing stored userconfigured location, not actual device location
current_city_flag
FALSE

Converted
Timestamp (UTC)
10/2/2015 11:16:04

city

country

Bremen

Germany 53.07561 8.80934
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lat

lon

Venturing beyond database review, the weather apps also seemed to cache location data
within text-based files, such as the AccuWeather app’s “accuwx_locations” and
“accuwx_geococder_cache” files. These files appear to contain historical location information
for the device, including coordinates and addresses, but they do not appear to store associated
timestamps for each entry. The following figures show snippets of some the content recovered
from these files.
{"adminAreaId":"FL","alias":"Balm","canonicalLocationKey":"2245533","canonicalPostalCo
de":"33598","countryId":"US","dmaId":"539","geocodedAddress":{"addressLine1":"13012
CR-672","addressLines":[],"adminArea":"FL","country":"United
States","formattedAddress":"13012 CR-672, Riverview, FL
33579","latitude":27.7632628,"locality":"Riverview","longitude":-82.2658239,
"maxAddressLineIndex":0}
Figure 16 - Content of AccuWeather app's "accuwx_locations" file
[{"Latitude":27.763,"Longitude":-82.266},[{"addressLine1":"13012 CR672","addressLines":[],"adminArea":"FL","country":"United
States","formattedAddress":"13012 CR-672, Riverview, FL
33579","latitude":27.7632628,"locality":"Riverview","longitude":-82.2658239,
"maxAddressLineIndex":0}]
Figure 17 - Content of AccuWeather app's "accuwx_geocoder_cache" file
Finally, some ad-supported games obtain device location information, enabling
advertisers to tailor their ads to a user’s surroundings. In the case of the apps tested, the location
information was not found in SQLite databases but in various text-based files. One example
involves the Words With Friends app’s “iad.dat” file, which was located in the
“\data\com.zynga.wwf2.free\files\.mmsyscache” directory. This file contained some apparent
location coordinates, however, they were not consistent with documented test session activity,
though still within the same general geographic region (same county). This was true even though
the device had access to the device FINE location, based on its permissions. The figure below
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shows the content as recovered from the file, with very precise coordinates (yellow), as well as a
notable reference to the device connection type (green).
"pkid":"com.zynga.wwf2.free","campaignid":"172693","idfa":""}},"respo
nse":{"adType":"INTERSTITIAL","creativeHeight":-1,"creativeWidth":1,"cdfId":"e1e4a6d7-1780-46b3-9876616b5b1393c1"},"ruleVariableValues":{"portraitwpx":360,"osVersion":{"
versions":[4,1,2],"versionCount":3},"mobileOS":"ANDROID","compilersdk
":{"major":"FIVE","minor":"FOUR","subminor":"ZERO","type":"a"}},"inst
anceCompilerOptions":{},"creativeId":"e1e4a6d7-1780-46b3-9876616b5b1393c1","mobileOS":"ANDROID","osVersion":{"versions":[4,1,2],"v
ersionCount":3},"deviceHeight":640,"deviceWidth":360,"location":{"lat
itude":28.082199096679688,"longitude":82.5239028930664,"accuracy":0.0},"placementWidth":1,"placementHeight":-1,"userAgent":"Dalvik/1.6.0 (Linux; U; Android
4.1.2; VS870 4G
Build/JZO54K)","language":"en","connectionType":"WIFI","

Figure 18 - Content of Words With Friends app's "iad.dat" file, showing latitude and longitude
values and connection type

App Trends
As the preceding analyses indicate, location data is cached on these devices in a variety
of file types, and many different types of applications can be potential sources of valuable data.
Searches for location data may be facilitated by manual review of database content, keyword
searches for possible text content and database column names of interest, and of course, review
of geo-tagged photos. The recovered location data may reflect the device’s location or
destinations and points of interest searched for by the device user.
Chat, location sharing, and fitness apps typically record the actual device location, with
varying, usually frequent update intervals and typically requiring a user interaction to initiate the
location caching. The web browser’s “localstorage” databases also seem to follow this trend. The
chat and web browser apps only update location information upon a user action, such as a sent
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message or a web search, respectively. These apps seem to save this data indefinitely or until
user deletion, and they appear to require enabled GNSS services to cache location data.
Leisure apps, on the other hand, seem more likely to store searched or viewed locations,
with only most recent device location information cached. They do appear to retain points of
interest permanently but do require user interaction to initiate any data caching, as well. They do
not appear to require GNSS sensor activity. Navigation and weather apps present a hybrid
approach, recording some actual device coordinates, not always with timestamps, but also
including searched locations or destinations. These apps appear to preserve the cached
information but also require user activity to initiate record keeping. The Waze navigation app
specifically requires GNSS functionality to perform the navigation function. Location artifacts
recovery from ad-supported game data proved somewhat nebulous, with the highlighted example
demonstrating possible unreliability of the stored coordinates.
Depending on the nature of the application, the recovered location data could be used to
pinpoint a device’s location at a particular time, demonstrate dwelling or travel, or illustrate a
user’s interest or intent to travel to a particular point of interest. The resulting findings could be
used to implicate a particular individual, refute or confirm an alibi, or corroborate witness
statements, as a few examples. While certain artifact or application types may be automatically
parsed by commercial forensic tools, examiners should also target both SQLite databases and
text-based files to recover possible location data of interest, focusing on apps with permissions to
the device location.
If a particular application is found to store data of interest, an examiner could further
consider installing the app of interest on a test device to better understand its behavior. For
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example, the examiner could attempt to determine if the app requires GNSS services to perform
its function or cache location data. This could have implications regarding the accuracy of the
recovered data. He or she could also evaluate if the application continues to cache data in the
background, or if any recovered data must the result of direct user interaction. Of course, app
functionality can vary from version to version, so an examiner would need to consider this
limitation when attempting such evaluations. However, by making this effort, an examiner may
be able to obtain greater insight into his/her findings and thus be equipped to present the results
with greater confidence and clarity.

Metadata and Logs
As seen in the previous review of the Waze app data, apps can and do store location data
in text and log files, not just in SQLite databases. However, as shown in Table 6, some app files
also appear to store metadata associated with device network connectivity that may be helpful in
evaluating the accuracy of cached coordinates. For example, the Locate My Friends app’s
“dumpLogsDatabase” from the OnePlus One A0001 device contained very detailed information
on the location requests, accuracy figures, and location coordinates. An example entry is shown
below, having been copied from the SQLite database record into Excel for easier viewing:
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{"locationInfo":{"epochTime":1444228846496
"dateTime":"Oct 7 2015 10:40:46 AM"
"data":{"locDB":{"timestamp":1444228823366
"provider":"fused"
"lat":27.9778361
"lon":-82.5132756
"accuracy":43.5
"alt":0
"age":"23129"}
"locNew":{"timestamp":1444228846236
"provider":"fused"
"lat":27.9778371
"lon":-82.5132754
"accuracy":36
"alt":0
"age":"259"}
"geolocation_meta":{"emode":"storeLoc"
"info":"DB: New loc with higher accuracy. Replacing loc in database"}
"device":{"battery":"82"
"charge":"1"
"wifi_state":"1"
"build":"10827"}}}}
Figure 19 - Sample entry from "dumpLogsDatabase" file
Aside from the actual latitude and longitude values, this database was also caching the
accuracy information, WLAN (“wifi”) state, altitude (“alt”), and battery status. Other entries
detail the location request type, such as “PRIORITY_BALANCED_POWER_ACCURACY,” as
well as cell tower connectivity, with one example reading "info":"New cell tower location
detected. Notifying policies." This level of detail is certainly illuminating, especially since this
log had such high granularity, sometimes recording multiple updates for a single second! Of
course, the extreme detail of this particular log did have a significant tradeoff: it only covered the
most recent day’s activity. Still, for one session running approximately 128 minutes, this log had
over 3000 entries! A small window, surely, but it is a very detailed one.
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Another database associated with one of the ad-supported free games, QuizUp’s
“mixpanel” database, as recovered from the Galaxy S5 test device, stored some information on
the WLAN connectivity history, but it was embedded in lengthy text records and was limited in
both quantity and scope. The information was timestamped, but the timestamps only pertained to
sessions in which this game was actually in use. Furthermore, the entries reflect the wireless
network connectivity state, not necessarily whether the WLAN sensor was active. As seen in the
figure below, these entries show “$wifi:false” even though the WLAN services were enabled at
the specified timestamps appearing toward the right side of each entry, based on test session
documentation. However, the device was not connected to a network at the time, so the reported
“false” status is consistent with the connectivity state.

Figure 20 - Contents of the QuizUp game's "mixpanel" database showing WLAN network state
with timestamp
The Amazon shopping app’s “event” database recovered from the LG VS870 device,
covered a much broader range of dates and times, and tags events with a plain-text
“connectionType:” parameter, listing either “WIFI” or “mobile” for each entry. This database
was reviewed to determine if the connection types reported were consistent with those noted in
the test session documentation. In most cases, the recorded connection types matched the active
services noted in the test session documentation. The exceptions again included sessions in
which the WLAN sensor was enabled but the device was not actually connected to a network.
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Exceptions are noted in the following table, which contains formatted samples of the data
retrieved from the database to facilitate review of the information. Actual data pulled from the
database is shown in the green columns, while author-added columns are presented in gray.
Table 14 - Examples of connection types logged in the Amazon app's "event" database that are
not consistent with test session documentation
Connection Type

Timestamp

connectionType:"mobile" 1433634088961

connectionType:"mobile" 1436961354568
connectionType:"mobile" 1436972419082
connectionType:"mobile" 1436974483466
connectionType:"mobile" 1437147300840
connectionType:"mobile" 1442675854508
connectionType:"mobile" 1442706821217

Converted
Timestamp
(UTC)
6/6/2015
23:41:28
7/15/2015
11:55:54
7/15/2015
15:00:19
7/15/2015
15:34:43
7/17/2015
15:35:00
9/19/2015
15:17:34
9/19/2015
23:53:41

Indoor/ Reason for discrepancy
Outdoor

Outdoor

Indoor
Outdoor

On but not connected to
network
On but not connected yet,
immediately subsequent
entries show connection

Outdoor

Driving
On but out of range of
network access point

Outdoor

Driving

Outdoor

Driving
On but not connected to
network

Outdoor

One more log file of possible interest was recovered from both of the non-Lollipop
devices (the LG VS870 and Galaxy S4 Mini) and was stored in the Google Mobile Services
directory. This database, titled “herrevad,” appears to track connections to saved WLAN
networks, including SSID and BSSID (MAC address) info, as well as timestamps. This content
could be valuable in placing a particular device within range of a known access point at a
specific time. However, during a review of the databases’ contents, it became clear that the
database did not capture all of the instances in which the devices were connected to WLAN
networks, based on test session activity. However, for those instances it did report connectivity,
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the information was consistent with test session documentation. An excerpt of the database
content appears in the table below, with author-added content in gray.
Table 15 - Excerpt of the Google Mobile Services' "herrevad" database showing WLAN network
connection details
ssid

security_type

bssid

timestamp_millis

COYG
COYG
COYG
COYG
COYG
COYG
COYG

4
4
4
4
4
4
4

20:aa:4b:32:21:3c
20:aa:4b:32:21:3c
20:aa:4b:32:21:3c
20:aa:4b:32:21:3c
20:aa:4b:32:21:3c
20:aa:4b:32:21:3c
20:aa:4b:32:21:3c

1436961710670
1436961823419
1436961964698
1436962208837
1436962385574
1436964198663
1436964362487

Converted
timestamp (UTC)
7/15/2015 12:01:50
7/15/2015 12:03:43
7/15/2015 12:06:04
7/15/2015 12:10:08
7/15/2015 12:13:05
7/15/2015 12:43:18
7/15/2015 12:46:02

From these examinations, it seems clear that connectivity-related log artifacts may be
quite useful in ruling out the possibility that the WLAN sensor was disabled at a particular time.
However, it may be more difficult to affirm that the sensor was indeed enabled at a particular
time, since these logs seem to only document when the device is actually connected to a network.
A device may have the WLAN functionality enabled but be out of range or not connected due to
wireless network security, for example. In situations like these, it seems the log files would not
indicate that the device WLAN feature was active, since the device would then default to cellular
data services.
Knowing this, and knowing that the Waze app requires “High Accuracy” mode to be
enabled for navigation functionality, it could be helpful to know when the Waze app is in use.
Fortunately, one database recovered from the Galaxy S4 Mini test device seems to do just that.
This database, titled “ContextLog_0.db,” tracks app usage in one of its tables, including start and
stop times, as well as duration and activity type. It seems to be specific to Samsung devices,
70

located within the “/Root/data/com.samsung.android.providers.context/databases/” directory.
Figure 21 below shows an excerpt of this database, filtered to show the Waze app’s activity on a
particular test date.

Figure 21 - Content of the "ContextLog_0.db" database, filtered to show Waze app activity
The Waze “NavigateActivity” entries are particularly interesting, knowing that the Waze
app requires all sensors to be enabled to perform the navigation function. Because the duration of
this activity is also reported, it could be of value in evaluating not just Waze application data
reliability, but also the potential accuracy of any location artifacts cached by other applications
during the same timeframe.
If another app had cached location data for a particular time, or if an investigator had
obtained a timestamped location from either cellular service providers or the cloud resources
previously discussed, a review of such metadata cached by seemingly unrelated apps could
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provide insight into the reliability of the location artifact, even if the information pertains just to
WLAN services. This would especially apply if the accuracy trends outlined in the literature
review section hold true. The next section addresses the evaluated accuracy of the location data
recovered in this study.

Accuracy Evaluation
Large and disparate quantities of location artifacts were recovered from the various test
devices. As previously reviewed, the location data is stored in varying formats and intervals. To
evaluate the reliability of the device location services, the recovered geo-tagged photos were
examined and compared to the actual locations documented both via the photos themselves and
the test session documentation. Additional examinations of the recovered cloud data were
performed to investigate its reliability, as well. From these reviews, a number of general trends
were noted.
Geo-Tagged Photos
As previously discussed, only two of the four test devices were found to store any geotagged photos, despite all devices being configured to geo-tag camera images and being used in
test sessions involving captured photos. Analysis of the geo-tagged photos from the LG VS870
and the OnePlus One A0001 test phones was performed to determine if any accuracy
determinations could be made. Each photograph’s embedded latitude and longitude values were
compared to the known location as captured in the image and noted in the test session
documentation, using an online distance calculator tool. A secondary tool was then used to verify
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the calculated distance. The figure below shows an example coordinate from one A0001 geotagged photo and its corresponding actual location, with the error distance displayed, as well.

Figure 22 - Geo-tagged photo example latitude and longitude accuracy check
Via this method, each coordinate recovered from the test devices’ geo-tagged photos was
evaluated for accuracy and an average value was calculated for the various test sessions. Test
session environmental and sensor parameters were also examined, with the results for each
device documented in the tables below. Fifty-eight photos from the A0001 and sixteen photos
from the VS870 were evaluated.
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Table 16 - LG VS870 geo-tagged photos, average accuracy
Device
VS870
VS870
VS870
VS870
VS870
VS870

Date
9-Jun
16-Sep
19-Sep
15-Jul
6-Jun
15-Jul

Number
of Photos
3
2
3
3
2
3

Environment
Suburban
Suburban
Urban
Rural
Suburban
Rural

Indoor/
Outdoor
Outdoor
Indoor
Outdoor
Outdoor
Outdoor
Indoor

Cell/WLAN/GNSS
Cell
Cell+WLAN
Cell+WLAN
Cell+WLAN+GNSS
Cell+WLAN+GNSS
Cell+WLAN+GNSS

Average
Accuracy (m)
130
29.5
67.3
19.7
28.5
30.3

Table 17 - OnePlus One A0001 geo-tagged photos, average accuracy
Device
A0001
A0001
A0001
A0001
A0001
A0001
A0001
A0001
A0001
A0001
A0001

Date
14-Jul
9-Jun
6-Jun
8-Sep
15-Jul
19-Jul
6-Sep
6-Aug
19-Jul
15-Jul
27-May

Number
of Photos
3
3
3
6
3
3
3
25
1
3
5

Environment
Suburban
Suburban
Suburban
Suburban
Rural
Rural
Suburban
Suburban
Rural
Rural
Suburban

Indoor
/Outdoor
Indoor
Outdoor
Outdoor
Indoor
Outdoor
Outdoor
Indoor
Outdoor
Indoor
Indoor
Indoor

Average
Cell/WLAN/GNSS Accuracy (m)
Cell
24
Cell
1373.3
Cell+WLAN+GNSS
3.7
Cell+WLAN+GNSS
3.7
Cell+WLAN+GNSS
4.3
Cell+WLAN+GNSS
5.7
Cell+WLAN+GNSS
10.7
Cell+WLAN+GNSS
10.9
Cell+WLAN+GNSS
15
Cell+WLAN+GNSS
16
Cell+WLAN+GNSS
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The results seem to support the notion that cellular-only derived locations are less reliable
than those in which the GNSS resources are active. Results from the two test sessions for which
geo-tagged photos were captured when only cellular and WLAN sensors were active also seem
to corroborate the notion that location data reliability does not suffer from a device’s use indoors.
Indeed, these results seem to indicate that the location data may be more accurate when WLAN
services are used indoors, but due to the small sample size, more testing would likely be needed
to determine if this observation can be applied generally.
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Cloud Data Limitations
Two preliminary issues present potential obstacles to the utility of the Google Location
History cloud data. The first involves the user’s choice to utilize Google’s location services. A
user may opt not to do so, though this option could severely limit the device’s functionality in the
conventional sense of how consumers utilize their smartphones. For example, a user would not
be able to utilize the Google Maps app. In short, most users likely do choose to use Google’s
location services, making this particular issue probably less significant. The “googlesettings.db”
database appears to store a record indicating whether a user has opted to allow Google’s services
access to the device location, as shown in the figure below.

Figure 23- Content of the "googlesettings.db" database
The “use_location_for_services” option is set to “1,” indicating that the feature is
enabled. This should indicate that Google Location History should be stored on Google’s servers
and therefore be retrievable using the Cloud Analyzer software or legal process to Google.
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However, this database was located in the Google Services Framework directory
(“/Root/data/com.google.android.gsf/databases/”) as recovered from two of the test devices. This
is not a coincidence, as these were the two non-Lollipop devices. This brings up the second
fundamental issue.
In the newer versions of Android, as previously discussed, many of the core Google
application data is excluded from the ADB backup process. This not only includes the database
that indicates whether a user’s location history may be recoverable using the Cloud Analyzer
software, but it also extends to a key resource used to generate the account package file
containing the necessary credentials to obtain the information: the “accounts.db” database. This
database stores the Google account information, with the login email address and an encrypted
form of the password, as shown in the following figure.

Figure 24 - Content of the "accounts.db" database
This database is stored under the “/Root/system/users/” directory, which evidently is also
excluded from the ADB backup process, as it was not recovered for either of the Lollipop
devices for which physical extraction was not supported. Without this file, the account package
file cannot be created, meaning credentials will have to be manually entered in the Cloud
Analyzer extraction process. Of course, this would require the examiner to know the user’s
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credentials or obtain them somehow. Furthermore, the manual entry of credentials does prompt
the notification email to the user that a new login from an unrecognized device has occurred.
Without a non-disclosure order of some kind, investigators risk alerting a suspect of their
activity, even if they are fortunate enough to have obtained the credentials somehow. Still worse,
if investigators cannot gain root access, obtain a physical extraction of the device data, or
ascertain the Google account credentials, they may not be able to retrieve the cloud data at all.
However, even presuming that the extraction of the cloud data is successful, another
limitation of its utility presents itself. This stems from the relatively less precise nature of the
retrieved coordinates. As described before, the Google Location History data extracted via the
Cloud Analyzer software appears restricted to a precision level of one thousandth of a degree.
This means the coordinates should be roughly within 100 meters of the actual device location.
Contrast this level of reliability with that obtained via the various apps reviewed, many of which
were caching coordinates on the order of millionths-level precision or better, and that makes the
Google Location History seem more of a general outline than a specific track. Note the higher
frequency and precision of the RunKeeper app’s cached data for the same timeframe as shown in
the figure below.
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Figure 25 - Cloud Analyzer (left) and RunKeeper (right) location data for same timeframe
Curiously, this same discrepancy in precision seems also to extend to the Google location
data obtained by downloading a .kml file via the Google account web interface. This involves
logging into the Google user account and selecting the “Control My Content” option from the
menu, then navigating to the “Manage Activity” option for the “Places you go” category, as
shown in the figure below. Notably, users can also opt to delete content via this utility, as well.
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Figure 26 - Google user account interface content management
From there, a user may view their Google location history for a specified day, or they
may opt to download or delete the content. Presumably, any such downloaded content would
resemble the corresponding timeframe’s data obtained via the Cloud Analyzer software for the
same device/user. To test this notion, the content for the date referenced in Figure 25 above was
saved to a .kml file, as shown below.
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Figure 27 - Option to save timeframe as KML file via Google user account web interface
Once this data was downloaded, it was mapped along with the corresponding data from
the RunKeeper app and the Cloud Analyzer locations. Curiously, the data downloaded directly
from Google’s user account interface appears far more precise than the associated Cloud
Analyzer data. So the initial assumption that the Cloud Analyzer data’s precision level was due
to a limitation imposed by Google appears to be incorrect. Google’s servers appear to be storing
much more precise information. Additional testing or inquiry would be needed to determine if
this is a limitation inherent to the Cloud Analyzer software, or some other reason. Figure 28
displays the map comparing the RunKeeper, Google account KML file, and Cloud Analyzer data
for the same timeframe.
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Figure 28 - Comparison of cached coordinates for same timeframe from RunKeeper (purple),
Google user location history (yellow), and Cloud Analyzer (cyan)
A number of clear observations can be made from this map. First, the Google user
account location history is clearly more precise than the Cloud Analyzer data obtained, even
though the Cloud Analyzer theoretically should be accessing and retrieving the very same
Google account data. Furthermore, the Google user data appears to correspond more closely to
the RunKeeper app’s data, with the Cloud Analyzer data forming broad geometric patterns
surrounding the more detailed tracks presented by the other sources. Given that the more
accurate location is likely to be the more precise one, it seems that the Cloud Analyzer data may
be limited to the 100 meter range imposed by its thousandths-level precision. Still, this level of
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accuracy will certainly be enough in many cases, and the high update interval would still be
useful in establishing patterns of movement or dwelling.
At a minimum, the Cloud Analyzer software offers another tool to investigators for
corroborating data or testimony from other sources. It is very dense, timewise, voluminous, and
it is clearly accurate enough to place an individual device within a block or so of a particular
location, at worst. Witness statements, suspect alibis, call detail records, or other resources could
all be better evaluated with this information. Given that the majority of Android users likely
utilize the Google location services that render this software’s function possible, it seems that the
cloud data resource could become a potential boon for investigators in criminal cases, provided
they are able to extract the necessary data to access the content or otherwise obtain the user’s
credentials.

General Trends
To evaluate the accuracy of the location data, content from both the information
recovered from the device and the Google Location History cloud data were reviewed for
coordinates with corresponding timestamps, then compared to actual locations documented in
test session records. Overall, the results seemed to support the previously stated trends involving
accuracy based on resource type. For example, locations obtained when only cellular service was
active were significantly less accurate than the same location information recorded in the same
place at approximately the same time when all sensors were active, as illustrated in Figures 29
and 30 below.
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Figure 29 - Actual versus Cloud location with cellular service only (error of over 1.5 kilometers)
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Figure 30 - Actual, Device, & Cloud locations with all sensors active (errors from 5 to 45
meters)
These figures depict how significant the impact of sensor activity can be. With all of the
sensors active, the error margin was reduced from over a kilometer down to a few meters for the
device cached information, a little more for the corresponding cloud location. Interestingly, the
cloud data point was not quite as accurate as what the device cached, even though all services
were active. This could very well be the result of the cloud data’s limitation to thousandths-level
precision. Figure 31 again illustrates the way in which cloud points, even with high frequency
and volume of locations, are hampered by the lower precision. The device is caching coordinates
on the order of ten-thousandths in the Map My Walk app’s “workout.db” database, and just that
extra power of ten clearly shows a much more refined track of the actual device location.
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Figure 31 - Map My Walk device (green) versus cloud (red) locations
The cloud track clearly is more angular and less precise, but it does capture the basic
outline of the movement, with errors generally in the 20 to 50 meter range. In another instance,
when only cellular and WLAN sensors were active, the error was in the over a kilometer range.
Figures 32 and 33 demonstrate how much of an impact activating the GNSS services had for the
particular area in question (traversed during a drive along the junction of Interstates 10 and 75,
and back again). In Figure 32, the error reaches up to about 1.5 kilometers without the GNSS
services. However, with the GNSS sensor enabled, the max error appears to go down to roughly
300 meters, though it is generally much less than that, as shown in Figure 33.
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Figure 32 - Location Tracker device data (yellow) versus cloud data (magenta) - no GNSS

Figure 33 - Location Tracker device data (purple) versus cloud data (green) - with GNSS
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The above figures demonstrate the relative accuracies in suburban and rural
environments, with and without GNSS services enabled. In general, there was no notable cost to
accuracy of cached device data when GNSS services were enabled, regardless of whether the
surrounding were rural or suburban, and very little cost noted for indoor use. In urban areas,
there did appear to be relatively little tradeoff for disabling GNSS services, perhaps due to the
higher density of cell towers and WLAN access points, as well as the possible interference with
GNSS signals due to concentrations of tall buildings. Figures 34 and 35 show some examples of
the location data obtained from testing in an urban environment with GNSS disabled and
enabled, respectively.

Figure 34 - Device versus actual versus cloud locations in urban environment without GNSS
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Figure 35 - Device (purple) versus cloud (green) locations in urban environment with GNSS
The purple route in Figure 35 reflects the more accurate route based on the test session
activity and was cached on the device by the Run Keeper app. There certainly is some
improvement over the relative locations displayed in Figure 34, in which only cellular and
WLAN services were enabled, at least for the device data. The cloud data is clearly less precise
and curiously less frequently updated (roughly every three minutes) for this particular timeframe.
The relatively less accurate cloud data for this instance could again be attributed to the
thousandths-level precision that characterizes it. Furthermore, the device was in transit in this
test session, and in similar sessions involving transit, the cloud locations also displayed a small
time lag.
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Efforts to evaluate the reliability of recovered location data using the cached accuracy
metadata focused on applications that reported their accuracy in real time via the user interface
during test sessions. These accuracy estimates were noted in the test session documentation and
later compared to the cached accuracy values. In the user interface, the accuracy values were
reported in feet. No units are specified in the accuracy metadata recovered from device SQLite
databases for the apps in question, namely Life360 and Locate My Friends, but numerically, they
were roughly in line with those reported via the user interface. These locations were plotted on
maps along with cloud location points with similar timestamps, then compared to documented
test session locations. In general, the calculated error values noted in the maps seemed as though
they’d be more consistent with device and user interface values if the reported error were
measured in meters rather than feet.
Overall, however, the general trends in terms of a hierarchy of source accuracy seemed to
hold true, with GNSS-enabled sessions recording the most accurate data. In some instances,
individual location points appeared to be within just a few feet of the actual test location. This
was especially true when GNSS services were enabled, but was also noted a few times when
cellular and WLAN services were running without GNSS. The maximum error range noted in
this study was still less than two kilometers off, and it was noted in test sessions involving only
cellular service and in less populated areas. Thus, even in the worst case scenarios of this study’s
conditions, both cloud and device-cached location data proved reliable enough to place a device
within a city, at the very least, and possibly into specific buildings, under ideal circumstances. As
both cell tower and WLAN access point infrastructure expands and increases in concentration
accordingly, it seems only likely that mobile device location data will become even more precise.
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Location Data Recovery and Evaluation Strategy
First, if an examiner has access to the various paid, specialized mobile device forensics
tools, a good deal of location of artifacts will be parsed automatically, including geo-tagged
photos, Google Maps searches, Waze recent destinations, and coordinates from various
messaging apps like Facebook or WhatsApp. If not, these are relatively easy to identify via the
use of free metadata parsers, in the case of geo-tagged media files, or SQLite database viewers,
for the various navigation and chat apps mentioned.
From there, Internet Explorer can be used to examine the “packages.xml” file, using a
simple “find” search for “ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION” and
“ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION” to identify applications with location permissions and the
directory paths in which their data is cached. The examiner may then target these directories for
further review, especially SQLite databases and XML configuration files. SQLite databases may
contain detailed caches of latitude and longitude coordinates, with metadata, and they may also
contain embedded images like map tiles.
It is also important to remember that some SQLite databases may store content of value
in BLOB data, which may be less intuitive to examine. Google Maps’ “gmm_storage.db”
database is a prime example, storing search terms and possible navigation history amongst other
proprietary content in BLOB data records. Keyword searches are appropriate for analyzing this
file, if an examiner is attempting to recover evidence regarding a particular location.
Alternatively, a very primitive approach could begin with using the Strings command-line tool to
output string content from the database to a text file, then filter the data in Excel to display
content beginning with “/dir/” to identify searches for directions with latitude and longitude of
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the position from which the search initiated, as well as the latitude and longitude of the searched
destination. Figure 36 shows some of the content recovered in this way from one test device’s
“gmm_storage.db” database.

Figure 36 - Google Maps directions artifacts recovered via Strings command utility from
"gmm_storage.db" database
It’s also important to note that embedded toward the end of these entries is a UNIX epoch
timestamp. Figure 37 shows this timestamp highlighted for record number 5236, which when
converted to readable time using DCode is: Saturday, 27 June 2015 at 22:40:00. UTC. A review
of test session documentation confirms that a Google Maps search was indeed performed using
the test device from which this database was recovered. Curiously, the timestamp converts to a
UTC value which should be four hours ahead of local time for the test location timezone, but the
converted timestamp is actually consistent with the actual local time at the time of the Google
Maps search. Incidentally, the source latitude and longitude from which the search was executed
appear at the beginning of the record and are extremely accurate based on the test session
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documentation. The corresponding cloud location for the same time was also quite accurate, with
all sensors active and the device located outdoors in an urban environment.

Figure 37 - Timestamp from Google Maps "gmm_storage.db" database directions search record
This is just one example of how examiners need to remain open to digging deeper than
what the paid forensic tools automatically parse, in their efforts to recover Android location data.
Beginning with SQLite databases and XML configuration files associated with known locationaccessing apps, examiners should perhaps worry less about reconstructing the particular activity
or resources associated with recovered location information and more about the details of the app
they have recovered the data from.
For example, based on this study’s results, it would seem that location sharing and fitness
apps cache extremely precise and reliable data, typically. Furthermore, navigation apps, which
are designed for safety reasons to provide a very accurate idea of the user’s location, store very
reliable information, though perhaps with less extensive local caching. This makes sense, since
users of fitness apps may want to review old workout routes and times to track their progress, but
users of navigation apps are more likely to search their current destination of choice each
session. Furthermore, if an app has only coarse location permissions, it may not be the most
reliable of sources of location data, though certainly still good enough to refute an individual’s
argument that they were in another town at the time, for example. Weather apps and adsupported games can fall into this latter category.
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In cases where investigators are particularly determined to use device location data to
pinpoint a user’s whereabouts, it could be helpful to check for files that may contain
timestamped logs of network connectivity or sensor states, even though these logs could be
associated with other apps that stored no location information. Keyword searches will do little to
directly recover latitude and longitude coordinates, but searching for terms like “latitude REAL”
or “lat DOUBLE” may help identify active or deleted SQLite database content that may be of
value. Databases and unallocated space can be carved for geo-tagged pictures or map tile images,
as well, though attributing context to these can be difficult, as it is hard to say if they reflect a
device’s actual location or just a browsing session or location search.
Also, if an examiner has a particular artifact of interest recovered from a known
application, he or she could utilize a test device, install the application of interest, and run some
tests to try to evaluate that app’s reliability in terms of location accuracy. From this study, it was
noted that some apps will not perform their designated function unless all location resources are
enabled, like Waze navigation, for example. Furthermore, some apps actually inform the user
during the use of accuracy estimates, as noted for Life360 and Friend Locator. Table 18
summarizes some location data recovery and evaluation strategies utilized in this study.
Table 18 - Recovery and evaluation strategies
Tier 1 – The obvious

Tier 2 – Dig deeper

Tier 3 – Beyond the deep end

Forensic tools’ parsed
artifacts

Identify apps with location
permissions

Carve for images, SQLite
databases

SQLite databases

Examine SQLite databases
and XML configuration files
associated with these apps

Keyword searches for possible
metadata/code terms

Geo-tagged media files

Test device analysis on app of
interest

Map Tiles
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Finally, examiners may wish to think beyond the device itself. Using call detail records
and cloud resources may allow for the corroboration of points recovered from the device, as well
as an expansion of the location data set. Although the data obtained via Cloud Analyzer was less
precise, it has a number of advantages. First, the user does not need to initiate any process for the
Google location service to begin collecting device location information, beyond agreeing to use
Google’s location services. So the process occurs in the background, virtually all of the time,
unlike most apps that cache location data which require a user to initiate a session or event.
Furthermore, the coordinates are updated almost every minute or so, so the information is very
dense and can indicate dwelling or travel, etc. Finally, because it is a background service, it is
unlikely a user could or would disable it, leading to potentially large volumes of location data
during timeframes when the device might otherwise not cache any.

Limitations and Future Research
This research was performed with some fundamental limitations. First, it obviously
utilized a small sample size of just four unrooted test devices, and the device and application
settings were optimized for location caching, which may not be typical configurations. Second,
the number and variety of test sessions clearly cannot account for all possible conditions in
which devices are used. Testing was mostly performed in suburban (residential) areas, with
access to rural and urban areas less frequent. Finally, devices were obviously accessible and in
an unlocked state, mitigating the potential hurdles to data extraction one might encounter in
forensic casework. This study does not address means of gaining access to locked devices or
encrypted data.
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Based on the emerging trends noted, these last issues could become serious impediments
to data recovery from Android devices. It remains to be seen how encryption will impact
Android forensics in the future. Furthermore, the shift to cloud storage definitely warrants future
study. Investigators and legal professionals need to be aware of these potential resources. Google
Location History, for example, could be used to refute or confirm an individual’s alibi, especially
if there is corroborating evidence showing the individual was in possession of the device at the
time of the incident. However, confusion about legal issues of jurisdiction and authority
surrounding the retrieval of this data certainly suggest that the criminal justice community will
need to continue learning about the technical and logistical details involved in the process.
Additional research into the Cloud Analyzer’s thousandths place precision level and its
relationship to the Google user account location history could also be interesting and beneficial.
Furthermore, one could investigate how long Google location history is maintained and if any
data can be retrieved using the Cloud Analyzer software after a user opts to delete it via the
Google account interface. It may also be of interest to further study the cloud data to determine if
the trend of no cloud data points being collected when cellular service is inactive holds true,
including whether or not airplane mode impacts this.
Perhaps some evolution in both investigative strategies and legal statutes is needed.
Certainly, this issue will only become more prominent as providers continue to emphasize
security and move toward cloud-based data storage. It would also be a very useful study to
develop a method for automating some of the techniques outlined in this paper. The volume and
complexity of data cached on these devices means manual review and correlation is tedious and
time-consuming. Finally, because there are now varied resources, from the carrier records to the
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device data to the cloud information, investigators should consider exploring all of these avenues
in their cases. An automated solution capable of incorporating all of these different resources and
streamlining their review would be a very valuable tool indeed.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
Smartphones and tablets are becoming more and more entrenched in everyday life, and
users knowingly and unknowingly store intimate information within these devices. Because of
the location aware features offered by mobile devices, as well as users’ tendency to keep them on
their person much of the time, device location history is both a real phenomenon and a
potentially valuable resource in criminal investigations. Android devices make up a majority of
the mobile market share, and this study’s exploration of their capabilities, strategies, and stored
data indicates that they do indeed possess large amounts of historical location data associated
with a particular device, and by extension, its owner.
One critical point to consider is that mobile device investigations now go beyond the
phone itself, extending not just to carrier records but also to potential cloud artifacts. As this
study demonstrated, vast quantities of Android device location points are archived on Google’s
servers. This information is updated often enough to demonstrate if a user is dwelling or
traveling, and to provide an estimate of their location likely accurate to within 100 meters, or
less. Furthermore, what really sets this resource apart is its omnipresent activity, running in the
background without any need for user-initiated sessions or events. Potential impediments to the
acquisition and use of the cloud resource include issues involving access or credentials, as well
as perceived ambiguity regarding the legality of obtaining the cloud data via a commercial tool,
such as CelleBrite’s Cloud Analyzer software.
In terms of the devices themselves, examiners should begin by examining data associated
with applications known to have permissions to the device location. Text-based files may be
triaged via keyword searching, and this technique may also extend to SQLite database column
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headers, though not floating point values, which is typically how latitude and longitude
coordinates are stored within the databases. Databases should be reviewed for location artifacts.
This study describes a number of example databases and their content. Depending on the type of
application, the cached location points could reflect the device’s actual location, or some
searched point of interest or destination. In other words, a device’s location at a particular time
may be either directly documented, or it may be inferred based on a viewed point of interest
nearby, or a navigation route with transcribed directions.
Different types of apps seemed to handle location data differently, with almost all
requiring some sort of user-initiated impetus to record the information. Fitness, location sharing,
and chat apps appear to store device locations with high precision. In general, these apps also
seem to require GNSS sensors to be enabled, although perhaps less so for the location sharing
apps. The update intervals are tied to the user activity. When a user employs a fitness app, the
device location may be updated up to every few seconds, as opposed to a chat app in which the
location is recorded only when a message is sent, with the proper settings configured to enable
location sharing.
Navigation and leisure apps also require user interaction, but these apps may store
locations more likely to be searched or viewed by the user, not necessarily the location of the
device itself. The cached locations do appear to be quite precise, but update intervals are again
tied to the user’s activity. In the case of leisure apps, and the Waze navigation app’s transcribed
turn-by-turn directions, the device’s location could possibly be inferred from these apps’ data.
Weather apps and ad-supported games did cache some location artifacts but were not as reliable
in terms of accuracy, and the update intervals were intermittent.
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It may also benefit an examiner to look further than the files or apps that may store
location data itself. Various log files may offer additional information regarding sensor activity
that could prove valuable in evaluating the accuracy of any other recovered device locations.
While GNSS sensor activity logs were lacking in this research, WLAN connectivity was
documented by several apps in several different contexts. Other log files monitored app usage,
which could be of interest when dealing with an app that requires GNSS operations to perform
particular functions or cache data. For example, if a coordinate pair of interest is found in an
examination, and then details from such a seemingly unrelated log files regarding app usage
reveal that a separate app, which requires GNSS services, was active at the time, it may bolster
confidence in the reliability or accuracy of the particular point.
Previous studies regarding accuracy trends noted during live tracking of test devices
noted that reliability improved whenever GNSS resources are used, with location points derived
merely from cell tower signals proving least accurate. Somewhere in between either extreme,
WLAN-supplemented services were reported as having decent accuracy of within 100 meters or
so. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these trends were corroborated in this study by the location data
recovered from the mobile devices themselves. The maximum error in this testing was roughly
around 1.5 kilometers, with a minimum error of within 3 meters noted. The maximum error was
in fact obtained when only cellular services were active, and in a rural area. The minimum,
however, was associated with a test session in which cellular, WLAN, and GNSS sensors were
all active, and in a suburban area.
Such an accuracy range is likely adequate for refuting an alibi, but investigators may
wish to have a better idea of how accurate a particular cached coordinate pair may be.
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Fortunately, multiple resources exist to facilitate such an effort, in the form of metadata and logs
stored on the devices themselves, to the option to review carrier records and cloud data as
corroborative sources. Examiners should not rely solely on commercial tools to parse location
data for them. They should actively search application data for possible contemporaneous
artifacts that may provide insight or verify a particular point, focusing especially on databases
and text files. The search should initially focus on apps with location permissions, but one should
not overlook the potentially valuable logging contributions of the other app types.
These strategies, along with the incorporation of external resources such as carrier
records and cloud data, may enable an examiner to be able to do more than just recover the
location artifacts, but also comment on their potential reliability as well. As device storage and
extraction techniques evolve, and cloud storage becomes more prominent, mobile device
forensic examinations will need to evolve, as well. Understanding the device functionality and
all of the possible resources available will help ensure that practitioners perform the most
effective and complete analyses they can, improving investigations and promoting informed
adjudication of civil investigations or criminal cases.
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APPENDIX A: TEST SESSION WORKSHEET
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APPENDIX B: APPS AND SETTINGS INFORMATION
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Table 19 - Apps and Settings Information
Category

Apps Tested

Custom Location Settings

Location Permissions
☒ Coarse
☒ Coarse
☐ Coarse
☒ Coarse
☒ Coarse

Life360
Locate My Friends
Swarm

Google Location Settings enabled
No track log settings noted
Linked to Facebook account
Linked to Facebook account
Set recording time interval to
smallest option
Recording distance interval set to
32 feet
Default track name set to Date
and Location
No logging options noted
Linked to Facebook
Location sharing enabled
Location sharing enabled
Linked to Facebook

Chat

Facebook Messenger
WhatsApp
Viber
LINE

Messages include location
No location options noted
No location options noted
No location options noted

Weather

AccuWeather
One Weather
GO Weather
Weather Bug

Enabled alerts, Use current
location
“Follow my location” enabled
Use current location
“Enable my location” checked

AdSupported
Games

Words With Friends
Trivia Crack
Quiz Up

Linked to Facebook
Linked to Facebook
Linked to Facebook

Leisure

Yelp
Foursquare
Field Trip

No location options noted
Location services enabled
No location options noted

Other

Location Tracker

Time interval set to smallest
(every 5 minutes)
Location resource options:
Mobile/WLAN, GPS, or Both
NMEA logging enabled

Navigation Google Maps
Waze
RunKeeper
Fitness
Map My Walk
My Tracks

Location
Sharing

Glympse

*(OnePlus
One A0001
only)
GPS Status Tracker
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☒ Fine
☒ Fine
☒ Fine
☒ Fine
☒ Fine

☒ Coarse ☒ Fine
☒ Coarse
☒ Coarse
☒ Coarse
☒ Coarse
☒ Coarse
☒ Coarse
☒ Coarse
☒ Coarse

☒ Fine
☒ Fine
☒ Fine
☒ Fine
☒ Fine
☒ Fine
☒ Fine
☒ Fine

☒ Coarse
☒ Coarse
☒ Coarse
☐ Coarse
☒ Coarse
☐ Coarse
☒ Coarse
☒ Coarse
☒ Coarse
☒ Coarse

☒ Fine
☒ Fine
☒ Fine
☒ Fine
☐ Fine
☒ Fine
☒ Fine
☒ Fine
☒ Fine
☒ Fine

☒ Coarse ☒ Fine

APPENDIX C: TEST SESSIONS
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Table 20 - Test Session Information
Date
May 27

Device(s) Used
OnePlus One
LG VS870

June 6

OnePlus One
LG VS870

June 9

OnePlus One
LG VS870

June 13

SM-G900P S5

June 14

SM-G900P S5
SGH-i257 S4
Mini

June 19

SGH-i257 S4
Mini

June 27

SGH-i257 S4
Mini
SM-G900P S5

July 14

OnePlus One
LG VS870

July 15

OnePlus One
LG VS870

July 15

OnePlus One
LG VS870

July 17

OnePlus One
LG VS870

July 19

OnePlus One

Environment Setting Category
☒ Indoor
☐ Rural
☐ Outdoor
☒ Suburban
☐ Urban
☐ Indoor
☐ Rural
☐ Outdoor
☒ Suburban
☐ Urban
☐ Indoor
☐ Rural
☒ Outdoor
☒ Suburban
☐ Urban
☒ Indoor
☐ Rural
☐ Outdoor
☒ Suburban
☐ Urban
☒ Indoor
☐ Rural
☐ Outdoor
☒ Suburban
☐ Urban
☐ Indoor
☐ Rural
☒ Outdoor
☒ Suburban
☐ Urban
☐ Indoor
☐ Rural
☒ Outdoor
☐ Suburban
☒ Urban
☒ Indoor
☐ Rural
☐ Outdoor
☒ Suburban
☐ Urban
☒ Indoor
☒ Rural
☐ Outdoor
☐ Suburban
☐ Urban
☐ Indoor
☒ Rural
☒ Outdoor
☐ Suburban
☐ Urban
☐ Indoor
☒ Rural
☒ Outdoor
☒ Suburban
☐ Urban
☐ Indoor
☐ Rural
☒ Outdoor
☒ Suburban
☐ Urban
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Active Sensors
☒ GNSS
☒ WLAN
☒ Cellular
☒ GNSS
☒ WLAN
☒ Cellular
☐ GNSS
☐ WLAN
☒ Cellular
☐ GNSS
☒ WLAN
☒ Cellular
☒ GNSS
☒ WLAN
☒ Cellular
☒ GNSS
☒ WLAN
☒ Cellular
☒ GNSS
☒ WLAN
☒ Cellular
☐ GNSS
☐ WLAN
☒ Cellular
☒ GNSS
☒ WLAN
☒ Cellular
☒ GNSS
☒ WLAN
☒ Cellular
☒ GNSS
☒ WLAN
☒ Cellular
☒ GNSS
☒ WLAN
☒ Cellular

Date
August 6

Device(s) Used
OnePlus One
SM-G900P S5

Environment Setting Category Active Sensors
☐ Indoor
☒ Rural
☒ GNSS
☒ Outdoor
☐ Suburban
☒ WLAN
☐ Urban
☒ Cellular
September 6
OnePlus One
☒ Indoor
☐ Rural
☒ GNSS
☐ Outdoor
☒ Suburban
☒ WLAN
☐ Urban
☒ Cellular
September 8
OnePlus One
☒ Indoor
☐ Rural
☒ GNSS
☐ Outdoor
☒ Suburban
☒ WLAN
☐ Urban
☒ Cellular
September 16 OnePlus One
☒ Indoor
☐ Rural
☐ GNSS
LG VS870
☐ Outdoor
☒ Suburban
☒ WLAN
☐ Urban
☒ Cellular
September 16 SGH-i257 S4
☐ Indoor
☐ Rural
☒ GNSS*
Mini
☒ Outdoor
☒ Suburban
☒ WLAN
☐ Urban
☒ Cellular
September 18 OnePlus One
☒ Indoor
☐ Rural
☐ GNSS
SM-G900P S5 ☐ Outdoor
☒ Suburban
☒ WLAN
☐ Urban
☐ Cellular
September 19 LG VS870
☐ Indoor
☒ Rural
☒ GNSS
SGH-i257 S4
☒ Outdoor
☐ Suburban
☒ WLAN
Mini
☐ Urban
☒ Cellular
September 19 LG VS870
☐ Indoor
☒ Rural
☐ GNSS
☒ Outdoor
☐ Suburban
☐ WLAN
☐ Urban
☒ Cellular
September 19 SGH-i257 S4
☐ Indoor
☐ Rural
☒ GNSS
Mini
☒ Outdoor
☒ Suburban
☐ WLAN
☐ Urban
☒ Cellular
September 19 LG VS870
☐ Indoor
☐ Rural
☒ GNSS*
SGH-i257 S4
☒ Outdoor
☐ Suburban
☒ WLAN
Mini
☒ Urban
☒ Cellular
October 8
OnePlus One
☐ Indoor
☒ Rural
☒ GNSS
☒ Outdoor
☒ Suburban
☒ WLAN
☐ Urban
☒ Cellular
October 8
OnePlus One
☐ Indoor
☒ Rural
☐ GNSS
☒ Outdoor
☒ Suburban
☒ WLAN
☐ Urban
☒ Cellular
*GNSS enabled for navigation sessions only. All other test activity performed with no GNSS.
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APPENDIX D: ANALYSIS TOOLS
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Table 21 - Analysis tools used in this study
Tool (Vendor/Tool Name)
CelleBrite UFED 4PC

Version
4.2.2.86

CelleBrite Physical Analyzer

4.2.6.4

CelleBrite UFED Cloud
Analyzer
Magnet Forensics
Internet Evidence Finder
Magnet Forensics ACQUIRE

4.3.0.412

Kali Linux

1.0 (64-bit)

Guidance Software EnCase

7.10.05.11

SQLite Studio

2.1.4

DCode
Microsoft Excel

4.02a
Pro 2013

Earth Point Excel to KML

2015

Google Earth

7.1.5.1557

X-Ways Forensics

18.5

Strings

2.51

Coordinate Distance Calculator

N/A
(web tool)

Movable Type Scripts –
Calculate Distance between
Latitude/Longitude Coordinate
Points

N/A
(web tool)

6.6.3.0736
0.6.0.0351
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Purpose/Usage
Extraction of data from test
devices
Analysis of data extracted from
test devices
Collection of Google Location
History data for test devices
Analysis of data extracted from
test devices
Extraction of data from test
devices
Extraction of data from test
device
Analysis of data extracted from
test devices
Analysis of databases extracted
from test devices
Timestamp conversion/analysis
Analysis of databases and cloud
data extracted from test devices
Conversion of Excel content to
KML format for use in Google
Earth
Import of recovered location
data for creation of figures
SQLite database carving,
keyword searches
Analysis of Google Maps
“gmm_storage.db” database
Web-based calculator to
determine distance between two
sets of latitude/longitude
coordinates
Secondary (verification) tool for
distance between two sets of
latitude/longitude coordinates

APPENDIX E: POSSIBLE KEYWORD SEARCH TERMS

110

Table 22 - Suggested keywords for recovery of metadata, application code, or sensor activity
Request Types

Metadata

Active Services

PRIORITY_BALANCED_POWER_ACCURACY
PRIORITY_HIGH_ACCURACY
PRIORITY_LOW_POWER
PRIORITY_NO_POWER

accuracy
altitude
elevation
recent

connectionType
mobile
WIFI
BSSID
SSID
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Databases of
Interest
latitude REAL
latitude
DOUBLE
latitude
INTEGER
lat REAL
lat DOUBLE
lat INTEGER

APPENDIX F: SQLITE QUERIES USED
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Table 23 - SQLite query details
Database Filename
360LocationDB

Associated
App
Life360,
Locate My
Friends

dumpLogsDatabase

Locate My
Friends

event

Amazon
preinstalled
app

Forecast_accu.db

AccuWeather

Fsq.db

Foursquare,
Swarm

herrevad

Google
Mobile
Services

Query Used
select locations.time,
datetime((locations.time)/1000,'unixepoch') as "Converted
Time (UTC)", locations.lat, locations.lon,
locations.accuracy, locations.speed, locations.altitude,
locations.bearing, locations.provider
from locations
order by locations.time asc
select logsTable.log, logsTable.utc,
datetime((logsTable.utc)/1000,'unixepoch') as "Converted
Time (UTC)"
from logsTable
order by logsTable.utc asc
select events.body, events.timestamp,
datetime((events.timestamp)/1000,'unixepoch') as
"Converted Timestamp (UTC)"
from events
order by events.timestamp asc
select forecasts.current_city_flag,
forecasts.device_updated_millis,
datetime((forecasts.device_updated_millis)/1000,'unixepoch'
) as "Converted Timestamp (UTC)", forecasts.city,
forecasts.country, forecasts.lat, forecasts.lon
from forecasts
select comments.createdAT,
datetime((comments.createdAt),'unixepoch') as "Converted
Time (UTC)", comments.lat, comments.lng,
comments.geoId, comments.contextLine
from comments
order by comments.createdAT asc
select local_reports.network_type, local_reports.ssid,
local_reports.security_type, local_reports.bssid,
local_reports.timestamp_millis,
datetime((local_reports.timestamp_millis)/1000,'unixepoch')
as "Converted timestamp (UTC)"
from local_reports
order by local_reports.timestamp_millis asc
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Database Filename
Messaging.db

Associated
App
Life360,
Locate My
Friends

Mytracks.db

My Tracks

Oneweather.db

1 Weather

RunKeeper.sqlite

RunKeeper

Tts.db

Waze

Query Used
select message.content, thread_participant.participant_name,
message.created_at,
datetime((message.created_at),'unixepoch') as "Converted
Time (UTC)", message.has_location,
message.location_latitude, message.location_longitude,
message.location_timestamp,
datetime((message.location_timestamp),'unixepoch') as
"Converted Time (UTC)", message.location_accuracy,
message.location_address1, message.location_address2
from message, thread_participant
where message.sender_id=thread_participant.participant_id
order by message.created_at asc
select tracks.name, trackpoints.longitude,
trackpoints.latitude, trackpoints.time,
datetime((trackpoints.time)/1000,'unixepoch') as "Converted
Time (UTC)", trackpoints.elevation, trackpoints.accuracy,
trackpoints.speed, trackpoints.bearing, trackpoints.sensor
from tracks, trackpoints
where tracks._id=trackpoints.trackid
order by trackpoints.time asc
select geocodes.city, geocodes.state, geocodes.country,
geocodes.lat, geocodes.lng, geocodes.lastHit,
datetime((geocodes.lastHit)/1000,'unixepoch') as "Converted
Timestamp (UTC)", geocodes.hits
from geocodes
order by geocodes._id asc
select points.trip_id, trips.start_date,
datetime((trips.start_date+points.time_interval_at_point*100
0)/1000,'unixepoch') as "Converted Time", points.latitude,
points.longitude, points.altitude,
points.time_interval_at_point, points.speed_from_last_point,
points.distance_from_last_point, points.point_type,
points.accuracy, points.distance_at_point
from points, trips
where points.trip_id=trips._id
order by points._id asc
select Jane.text, Jane.path, Jane.update_time,
datetime((Jane.update_time),'unixepoch') as "Converted
Time (UTC)"
from Jane
order by Jane.update_time asc
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Database Filename
User.db

Associated
App
Waze

Viber_messages

Viber

Weather.db

GO Weather

Workout.db

Map My
Walk

Query Used
select places.name, places.street, places.city, places.state,
places.house, places.longitude, places.latitude,
places.venue_id, places.created_time,
datetime((places.created_time),'unixepoch') as "Converted
Created Time (UTC)", recents.access_time,
datetime((recents.access_time),'unixepoch') as "Converted
Access Time (UTC)"
from places, recents
where places.id=recents.place_id
order by places.id asc
select messages.date,
datetime((messages.date)/1000,'unixepoch') as "Converted
Time (UTC)", messages.type, messages.body,
messages.location_lat, messages.location_lng,
participants_info.display_name, messages.deleted
from messages, participants_info
where messages.participant_id=participants_info._id
order by messages.date asc
select citynow.myLocation, citynow.cityName,
citynow.updateTime,
datetime((citynow.updateTime)/1000,'unixepoch') as
"Converted Time (UTC)", citynow.city_my_location,
citynow.state, citynow.country, citynow.timestamp,
datetime((citynow.timestamp)/1000,'unixepoch') as
"Converted Timestamp (UTC)", citynow.latitude,
citynow.longitude
from citynow
order by citynow.updateTime asc
select workouts.name, timeSeries.timestamp,
datetime((timeSeries.timestamp)/1000,'unixepoch') as
"Converted Time (UTC)", timeSeries.distance,
timeSeries.speed, timeSeries.longitude, timeSeries.latitude,
timeSeries.altitude
from timeSeries, workouts
where timeSeries.localID=workouts.localId
order by timeSeries.timestamp asc

115

REFERENCES
4RENSIKER. (2012, February). Android tracking – from a forensic point of view. [Weblog
article]. Retrieved from: http://articles.forensicfocus.com/2012/02/27/android-trackingfrom-a-forensic-point-of-view/
American Civil Liberties Union. (2014, November 17). AT&T comes out in support of stricter
standards for police cell location phone tracking. Retrieved from:
https://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/att-comes-out-support-stricter-standardspolice-cell-location-phone-tracking
Bairstow, D. (2015, July). The difference between location accuracy and precision and why you
need to know. [Weblog article]. Retrieved from:
http://blog.skyhookwireless.com/advertising/the-difference-between-location-accuracyand-precision-and-why-you-need-to-know
Barmpatsolou, K., Damopoulos, D., Kambourakis, G., & Katos, V. (2013). A Critical Review of
7 Years of Mobile Device Forensics. Digital Investigation, 10. Retrieved from:
http://www.cs.stevens.edu/~ddamopou/files/A_critical_review_of_7_years_of_Mobile_D
evice_Forensics.pdf#%FE%FF%00b%00i%00b%006%007
Blank, A. (2011). The limitations and admissibility of using historical cellular site data to track
the location of a cellular phone. Richmond Journal of Law & Technology, XVIII, issue 1.
Retrieved from: http://jolt.richmond.edu/v18il/article3.pdf
Brouwers, N. & Woehrle, N. (2012, July). Dwelling in the canyons: Dwelling detection in urban
environments using GPS, Wi-Fi, and geolocation. Pervasive and Mobile Computing, 9.
Retrieved from: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1574119212000752
116

Cai, C. & Gao, Y. (2013). GLONASS-based precise point positioning and performance analysis.
Advances in Space Research, 51. Retrieved from:
http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/science/article/pii/S0273117712005285

CelleBrite Mobile Synchronization, LTD. (2015). Extracting Legally Defensible Evidence from
the Cloud. Retrieved from:
http://www.cellebrite.com/Media/Default/Files/Forensics/White-Papers/ExtractingLegally-Defensible-Evidence-From-Cloud_WhitePaper.pdf
Cunningham, A. (2015, October). Android 6.0 re-implements mandatory storage encryption for
new devices. Retrieved from: http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2015/10/android-6-0-reimplements-mandatory-device-encryption-for-new-devices/
Daniel, L. (2014). Cell phone tracking evidence. Excerpt from the upcoming book: Cellular
location evidence for legal professionals. Retrieved from:
http://www.ncids.org/Defender%20Training/2014SpringConf/CellPhoneTracking.pdf
Davydov, O. (2011). Proceedings from Techno Forensics 2011: Geo-location Data in iOS and
Android Services and Applications: Finding, Processing, and Validation. Myrtle Beach,
SC. Retrieved from: http://androidforensics.com/download/presentation/Oxygen_Software_Geo_location_Android.pdf
Fox, A. (2015, January 28). Better cell phone location accuracy for emergency calls needed.
amNewYork. Retrieved from: http://www.amny.com/news/better-cell-phone-locationaccuracy-for-emergency-calls-needed-1.9876745
International Association of Computer Investigative Specialists (IACIS). (2015). Procedure for
gaining physical access to certain Android phone running Kit Kat. Michael, Ed.

117

Kroger, K. & Creutzberg, R. (2012). Proceedings from SPIE 2012: Forensics of Location Data
Collected by Google Android Mobile Devices. San Diego, CA.
Last, D. (2015, May). Understanding location information recovered from mobile devices.
[Webinar]. Retrieved from: http://www.cellebrite.com/MobileForensics/Webinars/understanding-location-information-extracted-from-mobile-devices
Lifchitz, R. (2010). Proceedings from the 27th Chaos Communication Congress: Android
Geolocation Using GSM Network: Where was Waldroid? Berlin, Germany. Retrieved
from: http://events.ccc.de/congress/2010/Fahrplan/attachments/1781_27c3-androidgeolocation.pdf
Making your app location aware [online training series].
Retrieved from Android Developer website:
https://developer.android.com/training/location/index.html
Mander, J. (2014, November 18). GWI Device Summary: Q3 2014. Retrieved from:
http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hub/304927/file-2301369304pdf/Reports/GWI_Device_Summary_Q3_2014.pdf?submissionGuid=02e0203b-d9944909-be35-d5fde304b774
Maus, S., Hofken, H., & Schuba, M. (2011). Proceedings from Cyberforensics 2011: Forensic
Analysis of Geodata in Android Smartphones. Glasgow, Scotland, UK. Retrieved from:
http://www.schuba.fh-aachen.de/papers/11-cyberforensics.pdf
Michael, K. & Clarke, R. (2013). Location and tracking of mobile devices: Uberveillance stalks

118

the streets. Computer Law & Security Review, 29. Retrieved from:
http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/science/article/pii/S026736491300058
7
Paiva, S. & Abreu, C. (2012). Proceedings from HCIST 2012 – International Conference on
Health and Social Care Information Systems and Technologies: Low Cost GPS Tracking
for the Elderly and Alzheimer Patients. Algarve, Portugal. Retrieved from:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212017312005191
Pew Research Center. (2014). Mobile Technology Fact Sheet. Retrieved from:
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/mobile-technology-fact-sheet/
Racioppo, C. & Murthy, N. (2012). Proceedings from Student-Faculty Research Day, CSIS
2012: Android Forensics: A Case Study of the “HTC Incredible” Phone. Pace University,
NY. Retrieved from: http://csis.pace.edu/~ctappert/srd2012/b6.pdf
RECENT Case: Sixth Circuit holds that “pinging” a target’s cell phone to obtain GPS data is not
a search subject to the warrant requirement. (2013, January). Harvard Law Review,
126:802. Retrieved from: http://harvardlawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/pdfs/vol126_united_states_v_skinner.pdf
Reisinger, D. (2013, November). 10 Android location-based apps to help you find your way
around. Retrieved from: http://www.eweek.com/mobile/slideshows/10-android-locationbased-apps-to-help-you-find-your-way-around.html
Riley, S. (2015, August). Should you root your Android phone? Retrieved from:
http://www.tomsguide.com/us/should-you-root-your-phone,review-2999.html
Sack, S., Kroger, K., & Creutzburg, R. (2012). Overview of potential forensic analysis of an

119

Android smartphone. Retrieved from:
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/258332974_Overview_of_potential_forensic_an
alysis_of_an_Android_smartphone
Saliba, J. (2013, December). Using geolocation artifacts and timeline analysis to solve the case: a
digital forensics case study. [Webinar]. Retrieved from:
http://www.forensicfocus.com/c/aid=69/webinars/2013/using-geolocation-artifacts-andtimeline-analysis-to-solve-the-case-a-digital-forensics-case-study/
Schumer, C. (2015, January 28). Schumer: First responders too often can’t locate victims when
911 calls are made from cell phones; could lead to potentially deadly delays in
emergency response time. [Press release]. Retrieved from:
http://www.schumer.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/schumer-first-responders-toooften-cant-locate-victims-when-9-1-1-calls-are-made-from-cell-phones-could-lead-topotentially-deadly-delays-in-emergency-response-time_schumer-urges-fcc-to-approveand-implement-strong-new-rules-during-meeting-tomorrow-to-strengthen-9-1-1-callaccuracy-from-cell-phones
Selyukh, A. (2014, November 16). Deal to spur better 911 call locating for U.S. cellphone users.
Retrieved from: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/15/us-usa-wirelessidUSKCN0IZ00L20141115
Sisak, M. R. (2012, August 27). Cell phone data used to solve crimes. The Citizens’ Voice.
Retrieved from: http://citizensvoice.com/news/cell-phone-data-used-to-solve-crimes1.1364074
Skyhook Wireless, Inc. (2015). Submit Wi-Fi Access Point to Provide Location. Retrieved from:

120

http://www.skyhookwireless.com/submit-access-point
State of Washington Senate Judiciary Committee. (2012). Cell phone location data. Retrieved
from:
http://www.leg.wa.gov/Senate/Committees/LAW/Documents/CellPhoneLocationDataMe
mo.pdf
Wells, A. (2014). Ping! The admissibility of cellular records to track criminal defendants. Saint
Louis University Public Law Review, 33:487. Retrieved from:
http://www.slu.edu/Documents/law/PLR/Archives/XXXIII-2-14/Wells_Article_0.pdf
Yang, J., Varshavsky, A., Liu, H., Chen, Y., & Gruteser, M. (2010). Accuracy characterization
of cell tower localization. Retrieved from:
http://www.winlab.rutgers.edu/~gruteser/papers/tower10.pdf
Yi, S. (2012). Geo-location Forensics on Mobile Devices. Retrieved from:
http://secmeeting.ihep.ac.cn/paper/Paper_Yi_Sun_ICDFI2012.pdf

121

